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JUSTICES DEAL SETBACK TO METHOD OF FUNDING LEGAL AID TO THE POOR
The Wall Street Journal
June 16, 1998
By Edward Felsenthal, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
The Supreme Court dealt a blow to a major method of funding legal aid for the poor, but stopped
short of wiping it out.
The case challenged a system that many states have used to help pay for legal aid since its federal
funding was cut in the 1980s. The states take interest payments that lawyers earn while they hold onto
clients' money, such as real- estate closing costs or fees paid in advance. Ordinarily, interest is turned
over to the client. But sometimes the money held is so small or kept for such a short time that it doesn't
make sense to set up an interest-bearing account. Under the state programs, that money is pooled into
larger.accounts, and the interest is turned over to legal aid.
The states contend no one gets hurt, because clients wouldn't earn interest on those funds anyway.
But the Washington Legal Foundation, a conservative think tank that filed the case, argued that even
small amounts of interest are private property and therefore protected by the Constitution. Many
conservatives believe legalaid programs tend to pursue cases for liberal causes, such as seeking higher
benefits for welfare recipients and filing class-action lawsuits on behalf of illegal aliens.
In a 5-4 decision, the Supreme Court agreed that the interest payments are private property,
rejecting the idea they are simply surplus funds created by the government. "The value is created by
the [clients'] funds," Chief Justice William Rehnquist said in an opinion for the majority, which included
the entire conservative wing of the court. "The state does nothing to create value."
But the court didn't address whether the state plans, known as Interest on Lawyers Trust Account
plans, actually violate the Constitution. Past cases make clear that not every government action
affecting private property amounts to an illegal "taking." The answer, many courts have said, depends
on how much an action interferes with a citizen's investment expectations. Lower courts now will have
to address those issues.
Almost every state has an Iolta plan, although some allow lawyers to not participate. Between 1983
and 1993, lolta plans contributed more than $400 million to state legal-aid programs.
Richard Samp, a lawyer for the Washington Legal Foundation, called the opinion "a resounding
endorsement of private property rights."
But Darrell Jordan, a Dallas lawyer who represented the Texas lolta plan, predicted there will be
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"several more rounds" before lolta's fate is sealed. "For us, it's a speed-bump," he said, adding that
opponents will "have a tough time" proving the plans are unconstitutional.
Justices David Souter, Stephen Breyer, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and John Paul Stevens dissented from
the majority ruling. (Phillips vs. Washington Legal Foundation)
Copyright 0 1998, Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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$100 MILLION IN LEGAL SERVICES FUNDING IS PLACED IN DOUBT BY A
SUPREME COURT RULING
The New York Times
June 16, 1998; Page Al8
By LINDA GREENHOUSE
A sharply divided Supreme Court today cast constitutional doubt on state programs that generate
$100 million a year for legal services for poor people by pooling the interest on some of the money that
clients deposit for brief periods with their lawyers.
That interest is actually the property of the clients, the Court ruled in a 5-to-4 decision that raised,
but did not answer, the question of whether channeling the money for legal services amounts to an
unconstitutional "taking" of private property for a public purpose.
That question will now be answered by the lower Federal courts or by the Supreme Court as the
case works it way back up through the legal system. Reaction today was sharply split over whether the
Court's handling of the initial property question foreshadowed an eventual ruling that the program is
unconstitutional.
The case, a challenge brought to the program in Texas by property rights advocates, represented
the leading edge of a debate that has taken place largely out of the public eye but that has galvanized
the organized bar in support of programs.
It is also the latest chapter in the long-running, ideologically charged battle over the fate of publicly
funded legal services programs, which conservatives in Congress have been trying to kill or curb
sharply for the last 20 years. According to a brief filed by the American Bar Association, money
generated by the programs is second only to the Federal Government as a source of funding for legal
services, accounting for as much as a quarter of the legal services budgets.
The Court split along ideological lines. Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist wrote the majority
opinion, which was joined by his four most conservative colleagues: Justices Antonin Scalia, Clarence
Thomas, Sandra Day O'Connor, and Anthony M. Kennedy. Justices David H. Souter, John Paul
Stevens, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Stephen G. Breyer dissented.
In declaring the interest to be clients' property, the Court rejected arguments put forward by the
chiefjustices of all 50 states, the American Bar Association, 35 state attorneys general, and numerous
government groups. These groups argued that properly understood, the interest should not be seen as
the clients' property because it would be nonexistent, eaten up by transaction costs, except for the
pooling arrangement that courts and legislatures in all states have adopted under a program known as
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Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts.
The idea for the program, usually referred to by its initials as lolta, began in Australia in the 1960's.
Its adoption in the United States was delayed until 1980, when Congress first authorized banks to pay
interest on checking accounts for certain types of depositors. Before then, lawyers typically deposited
short-term client funds, like escrow or settlement deposits, in non-interest bearing accounts.
Once interest-bearing checking accounts became available, the American Bar Association and other
lawyers' groups were quick to promote adoption of the Australian idea of directing the pooled interest
to legal services. They reasoned that for clients, the interest was largely theoretical in any event,
because the costs of opening an account and dealing with tax forms would quickly cancel out the
earnings from all but sizeable deposits. When actual net interest to a client was a possibility, that client's
deposit would not be pooled, but would go into an individual account for the client's benefit.
The Texas Supreme Court adopted an lolta program for the state in 1984. All states now have the
programs, which flourished at the same time that Congress was cutting the budget of the Legal
Services Corporation and placing restrictions on the types of cases that lawyers who work for the
federally funded programs can bring.
The case against the Texas program was brought by a conservative public interest law firm, the
Washington Legal Foundation. It challenged the program both as an unconstitutional taking of private
property and as a form of compelled support for causes not of a client's choosing, in violation of the
First Amendment. That aspect of the case was not before the Supreme Court but can be renewed in
the lower court proceedings that will follow today's ruling.
Chief Justice Rehnquist, in his majority opinion today in Phillips v. Washington Legal Foundation,
No. 96-1578, applied a rule of English common law that "interest follows principal." Because there was
no dispute that the principal on deposit was the property of the client, the Chief Justice said, it followed
that "any interest that does accrue attaches as a property right incident to the ownership of the
underlying principal."
This was the case, the Chief Justice continued, even if at the end of the day there was no net interest
for the client to receive. "We have never held that a physical item is not 'property' simply because it
lacks a positive economic or market value," he said, adding that: "The government may not seize rents
received by the owner of a building simply because it can prove that the costs incurred in collecting the
rents exceed the amount collected."
Whether the use of the property was a "taking" within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment or, if
so, whether any "just compensation" would be due to the clients, were questions for another day, the
Chief Justice said.
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Souter objected that the Court had announced "an essentially
abstract proposition" that "may ultimately turn out to have no significance" in resolving the ultimate
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constitutional question. If the amount of "just compensation" turned out to be zero, he said, "there
would be no practical consequence" to having recognized a property right in the first place.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in New Orleans, which found the interest
to be property in its 1996 ruling but stopped short of deciding the other questions, will now consider
the case again. "We're 90 percent of the way home," Richard Samp, the Washington Legal
Foundation's chief counsel, said today in predicting that his group would win the next phase.
The program's supporters were more tempered in their predictions. Jerome J. Shestack, president
of the American Bar Association, said in an interview that lolta programs were "more vulnerable, but
still alive" under the ruling today. Mr. Shestack speculated that if there had been a solid five votes on
the Court to decide the ultimate issue against the programs, the majority would probably have done
so now rather than preserve the issue for another day.
Copyright @1998 The New York Times Company.
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HIGH COURT APPROVES RETAIL PRICE CEILINGS;
Decision to Overturn Precedent Allows Manufacturers to Set Limits on What Sellers Charge
for Goods. Ruling Could Affect an Array of Industries.
Los Angeles Times
November 5, 1997; Pg. Al
By David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
In a decision that could lead to lower prices for everything from hamburgers and gasoline to cars and
computers, the Supreme Court ruled Tuesday that manufacturers and wholesalers can set retail price ceilings
for their products.
In its 9-0 ruling, the court overturned a long-standing doctrine that gave retailers the freedom to charge
as much as the market would bear.
Until now, advertisements promoting discounts, whether a 99-cent hamburger or a $1,000 auto price
break, had to include the warning "at participating stores only" or "at participating dealerships."
That was required because independent sellers could not be forced to charge the lower price. This
"maximum price fixing" had been deemed illegal under antitrust laws in a 1968 high court ruling, Albrecht
vs. Herald Company.
Economists and antitrust experts often had derided that decision as mistaken.
Certainly price floors- or "minimum price fixing," which is banned by law- make sense, they said. Price
floors hurt consumers because they prevent retailers from offering discounts.
By contrast, banning price ceilings hurts both consumers, who pay more, and manufacturers, who often
sell less, economists said.
On Tuesday, the justices admitted that the 1968 precedent was in error and threw it out.
"We conclude that Albrecht should be overruled," Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced for the court.
A "considerable body of scholarship" has shown that not all price fixing is harmful, she said. "Low prices
benefit consumers regardless of how they are set and they do not threaten competition."
Tuesday's decision has the potential to reshape the arrangements between manufacturers and retailers in
an array of industries, lawyers said. Now, franchise systems, product manufacturers and wholesalers can
negotiate new agreements with retailers that include price ceilings.
"It will take a while for this to work its way through the distribution chain in some industries, but I think
franchisers are likely to use this decision very quickly." said Steven B. Feirman, a Washington laxyer who
represented a coalition of familiar companies including Burger King, Wendy's, Motel 6, General Motors and
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Pillsbury.
"Franchisers have been very upset at their inability to deliver uniform low prices. It upsets consumers,"
he said. "This permits the companies to bring the renegade franchisers into line."
Officials of the American Petroleum Institute, the American Automobile Manufacturers Assn. and the
National Manufacturers Assn. were among those applauding the ruling.
"This is good news for manufacturers and consumers. It frees an auto manufacturer to say to a dealer,
'Don't charge any more than X price for a particular model,' " said Roy T. Englert Jr., a lawyer who filed a
friend-of-the-court brief for the auto manufacturers. A fixed lower price could help the company sell more
cars, he said.
The Federal Trade Commission and the Clinton administration had urged the court to end its ban on
fixed-price ceilings. The old rule "strips manufacturers of a mechanism that is pro-competitive," Assistant
Atty. Gen. Joel I. Klein, chief of the Justice Department's antitrust division, told the justices during arguments
last month.
Not surprisingly, retailers opposed the change. They said Tuesday's ruling will allow big companies to
squeeze profit margins for small distributors and independent sellers. Because retailers operate in a
competitive economy, they have not been able to gouge consumers by marking up their prices, they
maintained.
Janet Speelman, executive director of the Automobile Trade Organizations of California, said that the
decision will be disastrous for gasoline dealers.
"Under the guise of protecting consumers, it will allow oil companies to eliminate dealers, one at a time,
through economic eviction," said Speelman, whose group represent's the state's gasoline dealers.
She said the decision will allow refiners to squeeze dealer profits by raising wholesale prices while
lowering retail prices.
An attorney for the 10,000-member Service Station Dealers of America said he doubts the decision will
help consumers.
"Prices at the retail level are already very, very competitive," said attorney Peter Gunst. "I do not believe
the decision will have any effect on retail prices."
The case before the court involved a dispute between a Chicago-area service station owner and a gasoline
wholesaler. State Oil Co., the wholesaler, tried to impose price limits for its regular and premium gasoline
but the service station owner, Barkat Khan, resisted. He filed suit contending that the arrangement violated
antitrust laws.
Khan won in the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago, even though Chief Judge Richard Posner wrote an
opinion mocking the high court's 1968 precedent as "unsound when decided," "moth-eaten" by subsequent
scholarship and "increasingly wobbly" in its application. Nonetheless, it is the law until the Supreme Court
decides otherwise, said Posner, an antitrust expert.
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Ruling in the case (State Oil vs. Khan, 96-871), the Supreme Court took Posner's advice and overruled
its precedent.
"Chief Judge Posner aptly described Albrecht's infirmities," O'Connor wrote. Though the court is always
cautious about reversing a precedent, she said, the "great weight of scholarly criticism" had convinced the
justices that the legal rule prohibiting the setting of maximum retail prices was causing more harm than good.
Tuesday's decision stops short of saying that manufacturers are entirely free to fix maximum prices, the
high court noted.
If a retailer can prove in court that a particular price agreement amounts to an "unreasonable restraint on
trade" that hurts consumers, the agreement could still be deemed to violate the antitrust laws, O'Connor said.
But such cases are very hard to prove and unlikely to occur often, lawyers said.
In practice, manufacturers and wholesalers will have to work with retailers to establish price levels,
lawyers said.
"The trick will be finding the right maximum price, whether you are talking about Nike shoes or
supermarket items. You don't want to set prices too low. That will drive away your retailers. But you don't
want to set them too high either, because that hurts your consumers," said Mark Davidson, a Washington
lawyer for the National Manufacturers Assn.
The case illustrates how manufacturers and retailers often have different interests.
The 1968 case arose in the newspaper industry. Typically, publishers want to set low prices to increase
circulation. They make money through advertising.
By contrast, independent distributors earn money from the sale of the paper and would prefer higher
prices. At airport newsstands, for example, retailers often charge more for papers than the listed price.
The old ruling in the Albrecht case gave the sellers the freedom to set their own prices. Tuesday's ruling
will allow newspaper companies to insist on lower prices.
* Times staff writer Denise Gellene in Los Angeles contributed to this story.
Copyright @ 1997 Times Mirror Company.
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HIGH COURT SAYS PRICE CEILINGS AND SOME 'FIXING' ARE ALLOWED
The New York Times
November 5, 1997, Pg. Al
By Linda Greenhouse
In one of its most important antitrust decisions in years, the Supreme Court ruled unanimously today that
a manufacturer or supplier does not necessarily violate Federal antitrust law by placing a ceiling on the retail
price a dealer can charge for its products.
The ruling overturned a much-disputed 29-year-old precedent that regarded limits on retail markups as
illegal price-fixing, a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act.
No manufacturers announced any immediate plans to test the ruling, and it is unclear how soon the
change might be felt by consumers because the legality of markup limits will now be determined case by
case. Some consumer advocates said the Court simply shifted some power away from retailers in a decision
that could result in diminished competition. But the Court's action was widely welcomed by manufacturers,
who said it could eventually lead to lower consumer prices.
Under the ruling, for example, auto makers, freed to limit markups on popular models, might be able to
keep dealers from selling them for more than the amount listed on the sticker. Computer manufacturers
might be able to prevent retailers from charging exorbitant prices on hot-selling machines.
"We see this as pro-consumer; this will help to insure that the benefits of a manufacturer's pricing will
be passed on to consumers," said Max Gates, a spokesman for the American Automobile Manufacturers
Association in Washington.
Writing for the Court, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor said that there was "insufficient economic
justification" for prohibiting the practice, which is known as resale price maintenance.
A manufacturer's inability to limit markups, she wrote, can actually harm consumers by leading to higher
prices and to monopoly behavior by dealers who serve exclusive territories.
Justice O'Connor also noted that it remained illegal for manufacturers to impose minimum prices on
dealers- a version of price-fixing that is still automatically prohibited.
The decision grew out of a lawsuit by a gasoline dealer against his supplier, which had sought to limit
prices by requiring the dealer to rebate to the supplier any excess over the allowed markup of 3.25 cents a
gallon.
Reflecting the stakes involved, an unusually high number of briefs were filed on both sides of the case,
State Oil Company v. Khan, No. 96-871. Organizations including the American Automobile Manufacturers
Association, the National Association of Manufacturers and the Business Roundtable, representing the chief
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executives of 200 large corporations, all urged the Court to overturn the 1968 precedent.
The Justice Department and the Federal Trade Commission also urged the Court to overturn the 1968
ruling, Albrecht v. Herald Company. Joel I. Klein, the Assistant Attorney General for antitrust, told the Court
that the ruling had done "considerably more harm than good." Ceilings on prices are "likely to be pro-
competitive," Mr. Klein said during the argument, which took place Oct. 7
For the Court to issue a decision of this significance less than a month after the argument indicates the
Justices' confidence in repudiating a categorical approach to antitrust law, which had already been deeply
eroded in other contexts. For example, in 1977 the Court overturned another important antitrust precedent
and ruled that a manufacturer's use of exclusive dealer territories did not automatically violate the Sherman
Act.
In contrast to the prior rule, which made all markup limits illegal, today's ruling means such limits will
be evaluated by the Federal courts under what is known as the rule of reason, which requires a case-by-case
examination of the economic and competitive impact.
In other words, the decision today does not automatically validate all markup limits. The permissible
boundaries will be defined gradually as the Federal courts decide cases brought by disgruntled retailers.
The American Petroleum Institute, the trade group representing the oil industry, noted in welcoming the
ruling that the decision did not mean markup limits were necessarily lawful. But the group said the ruling
"does give the suppliers additional leeway in assuring that their products are marketed in a competitive
manner."
On the retailers' side, organizations of automobile and gasoline dealers as well as the attorneys general
of 33 states filed briefs urging the Court to hold the line. The Service Station Dealers of America,
representing gasoline retailers in 14 states, told the Court that abandoning the absolute rule against setting
maximum prices would give suppliers "coercive power over existing franchisees and dealers."
The states' coalition, led by New York and including Connecticut and New Jersey, told the Court that a
retreat from its historical "condemnation of all forms of price-fixing" would "launch buyers and sellers in all
markets, now governed by clear rules of conduct, upon a sea of doubt."
The Newspaper Association of America filed a brief, joined by The New York Times and other
newspapers, that urged the Court to overturn the 1968 precedent. The brief said newspapers often found
themselves at odds with their distributors because each was motivated by a different incentive: the
distributors wanted a maximum profit per copy, even if the result was fewer sales, while the newspapers
typically wanted to maintain or increase circulation, the basis for advertising rates.
The 1968 decision itself grew out of an effort by a newspaper publisher to grant exclusive territories to
independent carriers who would not exceed the publisher's desired price.
The tension between newspaper publishers and distributors is mirrored in many other economic sectors
where a retailer's desire for higher profits may conflict with a manufacturer's goal of greater volume. Unable
to set markup limits, many manufacturers have used other tools to control their retailers' behavior, like
consumer rebates and direct advertising, which makes it difficult for a retailer to exceed an advertised price.
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The decision today overturned a 1996 ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit, in Chicago. That court ruled reluctantly that a gasoline supplier's effort to set maximum allowable
retail prices was an antitrust violation. The appeals court said that while the Supreme Court's 1968 precedent
was "unsound when decided" and "inconsistent with later decisions," lower courts had to follow the law until
the Justices themselves overruled it.
Some industry experts said the decision today would probably have little effect on products like gasoline.
Most dealers set their prices based on local competitive conditions, and if they set prices too high, other
stations tend to force them down.
The ruling's impact on auto prices is also unclear. Although it could give auto makers additional leverage
in preventing dealers from charging more than the list price, dealers historically have found ways to
maximize their profits.
Some dealers are skilled at preventing manufacturers from discovering big price markups. One method,
for example, is for a dealer to sell a popular car to a friend at list price and let the friend resell it immediately
at a higher price to someone waiting for the car, with the dealer and friend splitting the difference.
Even if auto makers try to make use of the Court's ruling, "the dealers will come up with a way to get
around it," said George E. Hoffer, an economics professor at Virginia Commonwealth University who
specializes in auto dealership issues.
Some consumer advocates were decidedly pessimistic that the Court's ruling would result in lower prices.
Rather, they said, it might just diminish a merchant's ability to determine prices.
Edwin S. Rothschild, the energy policy director for Citizen Action, a Washington-based consumer group,
said the Court was "reinventing the Middle Ages, that retailers are not free, that they are serfs."
"This is America," he said. "You're supposed to be able to price goods to attract people or not attract
people. That's supposed to determine whether you stay in business or not. Why should we give control to
the wholesalers?"
Copyright @ 1997 The New York Times Company.
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HIGH COURT LIMITS CREDIT UNION'S MEMBERSHIP RANGE
The Washington Post
February 26, 1998, Pg. A06
By Joan Biskupic*, Washington Post Staff Writer
The Supreme Court ruled yesterday that individual credit unions cannot broadly draw members from a
variety of occupations. The decision upsets long-standing federal policy and could significantly limit
consumer options and the ability of credit unions to compete with banks.
By a 5 to 4 vote, the court said regulators wrongly interpreted a Depression-era law and permitted
federally chartered credit unions to enroll millions of workers in different companies and locations. The long-
awaited ruling in the case that was argued on the first Monday in October- the first day of the current court
term- immediately sparked a battle in Congress over legislation to revise the 1934 statute. At stake,
according to the Justice Department, is more than $100 billion held in certain credit unions.
It is unlikely, however, that any credit union customers will be forced out or will see an immediate change
in service. The American Bankers Association, which helped bring the case, has withdrawn an earlier
demand that credit unions get rid of the 20 million members who signed up under the liberal membership
policy. (Overall, 70 million people belong to federal credit unions nationwide.) But the growth of some credit
unions will be stunted, and their officials predicted they will scale back marketing and technology efforts
undertaken to compete with local banks.
As quickly as the ruling was announced yesterday, banking and credit union lobbyists pounced on Capitol
Hill, where legislation is pending to allow individual credit unions to serve a broad clientele. The fight will
be over who can join the nonprofit, tax-exempt cooperatives that tend to offer lower fees and better rates
on loans. But some banking officials have vowed also to renew their opposition to credit union exemptions
from the federal regulation and taxes imposed on banks.
Rep. Steven C. LaTourette (R-Ohio), lead sponsor of a bill to expand credit unions, noted that the law
bars people who work for companies with fewer than 500 employees from forming their own credit unions,
and those workers would be unable to join with other small companies to create a cooperative offering
deposit and lending services.
"The bulk of the American economic engine is now in [companies] with less than 500 employees. We're
not talking about big steel companies anymore," LaTourette said.
House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) endorsed the legislation, saying, "I believe in community-level
activism. I believe in local folks helping local folks."
But Edward L. Yingling, lead lobbyist for the American Bankers Association, said, "We hope that the
Congress will not be stampeded."
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"Credit unions are making millions of dollars and they don't pay any federal taxes. When they start acting
just like banks . . they ought to grow up and pay their fair share of taxes," he said.
But he also said the bankers' position is "not to seek any remedy that would require any current customer
to lose his or her account."
While Congress created the cooperatives to provide services to low-income people whom banks were
ignoring, credit unions over the decades have expanded their clientele and services, and flourished. The
1934 law says credit unions must be limited to groups with a "common bond" of occupation, association or
geographical area. In 1982, responding to company downsizing and a recession, the National Credit Union
Administration said that as long as each of the smaller groups within a credit union shared a common
employment bond, the condition was met.
In yesterday's case from North Carolina, five banks and the American Bankers Association argued that
the law means the same bond of occupation has to unite every member. The banks were protesting a
cooperative that originally was limited to workers of Western Electric Co. (owned by AT&T Corp.) and had
expanded to employees at Duke Power Co., Black & Decker Corp., the American Tobacco Co., a Coca-Cola
bottler and others.
On that threshold question, Justice Clarence Thomas wrote for the court yesterday that the banks' interest
in limiting the markets that credit unions can serve falls within the scope of the statute, so they have standing
to sue.
The dissenters- Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen G.
Breyer- disagreed on the standing issue and didn't reach the merits of the case. The statute, O'Connor wrote,
is not concerned "with protecting the business interests of competitors."
On the merits, the majority said the "common bond" requirement is not satisfied when employees of
unrelated companies are joined in one credit union.
In affirming a decision by the appeals court for the D.C. Circuit. Thomas wrote, "Congress has made
clear that the same common bond of occupation must unite each member."
Joining him in the majority in National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust were
Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony M. Kennedy and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg.
*- Staff writer Michelle Singletary and staff researcher Ben White contributed to this report.
Copyright @ 1998 The Washington Post.
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CREDIT UNION LOSE TO BANKS IN HIGH COURT
The New York Times
February 26, 1998
By Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court gave the banking industry an important if perhaps temporary victory today in an
intensifying battle to stop the expansion of credit unions. It invalidated a Federal regulation that had allowed
millions of people to join the alternatives to banks.
The Court's ruling threw into question the status of as many as 20 million customers of credit unions, the
organizations that were born out of the hardships of the Great Depression and have grown into pesky bank
rivals in recent years with an array of basic, affordable services ranging from mortgages to checking accounts
to A.T.M.'s.
"If this decision is allowed to stand, it would be a massive loss for consumers and choice," said Dan A.
Mica, president of the Credit Union National Association. "We think we are a counterbalance to banks, and
if we were not there the cost of services would go up for all consumers."
Partly because they expected such a ruling, credit union leaders had been gathering support in Congress
for a bill that would permit them to expand their membership, effectively overturning the Court's decision.
The battle will now shift to that bill, which has 138 co-sponsors from both parties.
But banks have vowed to fight the bill, and it remains unclear how many credit union customers will
ultimately be affected when the battle is resolved.
Representatives of the banking industry disavowed any desire to force credit unions to drop members.
"It is not our intent to create credit union widows and orphans," Monique E. Hanis, director of marketing
for the Independent Bankers Association, said. The American Bankers Association, the industry's main trade
group, also said it would not seek a solution that forced credit unions to give up members. However, Virginia
McGuire, a spokeswoman for the American Bankers Association, said it was possible that credit unions
might have to give up some groups of members that joined since July 30, 1996, when a lower-court decision
set the stage for the Court's ruling today.
The question of how to remedy the regulation's invalidity is now before the Federal District Court here,
which has delayed that phase of the case for more than a year while the Supreme Court reviewed the merits
of the issue.
By a vote of 5 to 4, the Court invalidated a 1982 Federal regulation that had permitted thousands of credit
unions to expand their membership base far beyond the relatively narrow employee and community groups
around which credit unions were originally organized.
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The American Bankers Association had challenged the 1982 regulation on the ground that it violated a
1934 Federal law requiring credit unions to limit membership to "groups having a common bond of
occupation or association." In an opinion by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Supreme Court agreed.
The regulation issued by the National Credit Union Administration interpreted the phrase "common bond"
so broadly, Justice Thomas said, that "it would be permissible to grant a charter to a conglomerate credit
union whose members would include the employees of every company in the United States."
The majority opinion, which upheld a 1996 ruling by the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, was joined by Chief Justice William H. Rehnquist and by Justices Anthony M.
Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Antonin Scalia.
The four dissenters- Justices Sandra Day O'Connor, John Paul Stevens, David H. Souter and Stephen
G. Breyer- did not address the merits of the case. Rather, they disputed the bankers' right to have brought
the suit in the first place. Banks did not have standing to challenge the regulation, the dissenters said in an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, because banks' competitive stake in the outcome did not place them within the
"zone of interests" of the statute at issue, which was aimed at regulating credit unions.
Even though the effects of the Court's decision may be temporary, leaders of the credit union industry
continued to wam today that membership for millions of people was still at risk. By coincidence, 4,000 credit
union members were in Washington today for the first phase of a lobbying effort in expectation of a Supreme
Court defeat. "This is a major, massive survival issue for us and we plan to win," Mr. Mica said.
While the legislative outlook is uncertain, the credit unions appear to have won the initial support of some
of the more powerful members of Congress.
On the question of the implications of applying the ruling retroactively. "It is inconceivable to me that
Congress will allow millions of Americans to be kicked out of the financial institution of their choice," said
Representative Jim Leach, an Iowa Republican and the House Banking Committee chairman. He plans to
hold hearings on credit union membership next month.
On Tuesday, the House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, announced his support of the bill that would write the
invalidated regulation into law. The sponsors are Representatives Steven C. LaTourette, Republican of Ohio,
and Paul E. Kanjorski, Democrat of Pennsylvania. While no corresponding measure has been introduced in
the Senate, Senator Alfonse M. D' Amato, the New York Republican who is chairman of the Senate Banking
Committee, said today that "Congress should and will enact legislation to restore the basic right of Americans
to join credit unions."
Given the lobbying power of both sides of the debate, analysts said they expected a real struggle when
legislation was presented before the House Banking Committee.
"We intend to nullify the court's decision," Mr. LaTourette said today. "1 would be shocked if the House
and Senate didn't get something to the President before we adjourn for the year."
Edward F Furash, chairman and chief executive of Furash & Company, a Washington-based financial
service industry consultancy, said he expected a "big huge fight" on Capitol Hill.
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The case today, the National Credit Union Administration v. the First National Bank & Trust Company,
No. 96-843, is rooted in the recession of the early 1980's. Faced with the prospect of bailing out the credit
unions of small companies that were failing in substantial numbers, the National Credit Union Administration
looked for ways to insulate credit unions from the fortunes of single employers.
For nearly 50 years, the agency had interpreted the Depression-era statute that put credit unions under
Federal regulation as placing sharp limits on membership. Section 109 of the Federal Credit Union Act of
1934 provides that "Federal credit union membership shall be limited to groups having a common bond of
occupation or association, or to groups within a well-defined neighborhood, community, or rural district."
For employee-based credit unions, the agency had interpreted this language to require all members of the
credit union to be united by a "common bond."
Under its reinterpretation issued in 1982, however, the credit union administration began permitting
membership by wholly unrelated employee groups, as long as each group had its own common bond. A
rapid expansion of credit unions resulted. Today, 3,600 of the 7,000 federally chartered credit unions have
members from multiple occupational groups, including many of the biggest credit unions, with 32 million
members and 79 percent of all deposits.
Enabled by Federal tax regulations to offer relatively low rates on loans and services, the credit unions
began vigorous head-to-head competition with local banks for home mortgages, car loans and checking
accounts. Not surprisingly, the banks fought back with lawsuits.
The target of the case before the Court was the AT&T Family Credit Union, based in Winston-Salem,
N.C., and originally created in 1952 to serve employees of the Western Electric Company. It now has 300
separate employee groups, including employees of a Coca-Cola bottler and the Duke Power Company. A
group of North Carolina banks joined the American Bankers Association in filing suit in 1990.
Copyright @ 1998 The New York Times Company.
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AT&T CORP. V. IOWA UTILITIES BOARD
By Troy R. Rackham
Telecommunications is certainly different in the 1990s, with faxes, computers, fiber optics, cable,
etc., than it was in 1934 when Congress passed the first Telecommunications Act aimed at regulating
the telecommunications industry. For more than 60 years, the telecommunications industry was
governed by this 1934 Act as interpreted by the federal courts.
In 1996, Congress finally enacted a comprehensive bill aimed at altering the face of
telecommunications regulations-- the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the "Act.") The bill was
designed, in part, to increase the competition in local and long-distance telephone markets by opening
up these monopolistic markets to other providers which had been previously excluded. This increased
competition, so the reasoning went, would then force prices down and increase the quality and quantity
of services available to the consumer. Of course, local phone networks, who have traditionally had a
monopoly over providing local connection services, have not taken kindly to the Telecommunications
Act's mandate of opening up local telephone exchange carriers (LEC's) to competition from other
possible providers (like the big long-distance providers AT&T, MCI, and Sprint). This is the backdrop
against which the case A T&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board hits the Court.
At issue in AT&T Corp. is whether the Federal Communications Commission lacks the statutory
authority to regulate prices that incumbent LEC's may charge in carrying out the Act's mandate to offer
interconnection, unbundled access, and resale services to new competitors in local
telephone markets, as well as prices for transport and termination of local telecommunications traffic.
The authority to regulate these prices has traditionally rested with the individual states. Pursuant to
its interpretation of the Act, the FCC issued pricing guidelines in 1996 to ensure that new competitors
would get a deeper discount than they were getting in their independent negotiations with the various
LEC's.
The LEC's challenged these guidelines in federal court, arguing that the FCC does not have the
authority to issue pricing guidelines under the Act or elsewhere. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals
agreed and held that the Act confers exclusive authority on state utility commissions to determine
prices that incumbent LECs may charge for fulfilling their duties under the Act.
The Eighth Circuit also held that the FCC unreasonably interpreted the Act when it issued its "pick
and choose" rule. The "pick and choose" rule essentially "allow[s] requesting carriers to 'pick and
choose' among individual provisions of other interconnection agreements that have previously been
negotiated between an incumbent LEC and other requesting carriers without being required to accept
the terms and conditions of their agreeents in their entirety." Iowa Utilities Board v. Federal
Communications Commission, § 2B.
Finally, the Eighth Circuit held that FCC's regulations, which prevent the incumbent LEC's from
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separating their networks and services which they currently combine, contravene the commandment
of the Act that these services can be purchased by competing carriers on an unbundled basis.
The Eighth Circuit is the first Court of Appeals to deal with this issue. Thus, the Court seemingly
granted certiorari because it wanted to give a definitive answer in a vitally important area of the law.
Indeed, the fact that the Eighth Circuit's opinion includes thirty-one pages listing the parties involved
in the suit evidences the case's importance. What is more, in addition to the briefs filed by the
petitioners (AT&T Corp.) and respondents (State Commission and the National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commission), amicus briefs have been filed by organizations such as the United
States Telephone Association, BellSouth Corporation, Pacific Bell, Southwestern Bell, The Bank of
New York, Citibank N.A., BankAmerica Corporation, First Data Corporation, Ford Motor Company,
Honeywell, Inc., Hyatt Corporation, and Microsoft, among others.
Beside the significant pecuniary impact this case will have upon the telecommunications industry,
including providers, investors, and consumers, this case may also have important federalism concerns.
The central issue presented to the Court is one of preemption. In their brief, the State Commission
Respondents framed the issue this way: "Whether the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) may
preempt the State public service commissions' discretion to implement key provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Telecommunications Act of 1996.. . ." Regardless
of how the Court decides this case, its decision will have a significant impact upon telecommunications
law.
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SUPREME COURT ACCEPTS PHONE RIVALRY CASE
The Washington Post
January 27, 1998
By Joan Biskupic; Mike Mills, Washington Post Staff Writers
The Supreme Court announced yesterday that it will resolve a dispute over federal regulations
intended to bring greater competition, and potentially lower consumer prices, to the nation's $110
billion local telephone markets.
The justices will hear a challenge brought by the Clinton administration and long-distance
companies to a lower-court ruling that sharply curtailed the ability of federal regulators to set terms
on the prices that competitors must pay to connect to local phone networks.
The Justice Department said the ruling last July by the 8th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals undercut
government efforts to carry out a central goal of the 1996 Telecommunications Act, breaking down
monopolies and fostering competition in the local calling industry dominated by the regional Bell
companies and GTE Corp.
But the dispute -- actually, eight consolidated cases -- will not be heard by the high court until the
fall, and a decision might be at least a year away. That is likely to further delay new competition both
in local markets and the long-distance industry.
Although the dispute involves terms for prices and connections in local competition, an overriding
question is the Federal Communications Commission's ability to set national policy -- possibly at the
expense of individual states -- under the 1996 statute representing the greatest overhaul of
telecommunications law this century.
Analysts said the high court's decision could delay not only the pace of local telephone competition
but also efforts by the regional Bell companies to enter the long-distance business. The FCC must
approve a Bell company's request to offer long-distance, but first agency members must be persuaded
that a Bell company sufficiently allows local phone competition.
The 8th Circuit ordered the FCC on Jan. 23 to "cease and desist" from requiring that its pricing
guidelines be applied as a condition for approving a Bell company's application to offer long-distance
service. The FCC in August had rejected a petition by Ameritech Corp., a Midwest regional phone
company, to offer long-distance service in Michigan, in part on grounds that it failed to follow FCC
pricing guidelines when setting its connection rates for competitors.
"This is going to slow everybody down," said Stephanie Comfort, a telecommunications analyst
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with Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. "It will be hard for states to make decisions" on local competition
issues with the case pending, she said.
The 1996 law requires existing local telephone companies to sell the use of their equipment and
service connections to competitors, so long-distance providers such as MCI Communications Corp.
and AT&T Corp. can offer their local service to customers.
The purchasing method primarily at issue involves a competitor's ability to buy access to the entire
telephone network at a discount wholesale rate, and then to sell that service under its own brand name.
(Because it would be exorbitantly expensive for a company trying to break into the market to build a
network from scratch, reselling service is seen as a good, although short term, way to enter the
residential calling market.)
But the regional Bells and GTE have been fighting with AT&T, MCI, Sprint Corp. and other
potential new local service rivals over network pricing and connection costs. Most discounts negotiated
across the country have been in the 15 percent to 25 percent range -- not enough, AT&T and MCI
officials have said recently, to make it worthwhile for their companies to pursue a resale approach.
The FCC attempted in 1996 to ensure that new competitors would get a deeper discount by
proposing pricing "guidelines" that states should use when arbitrating disputes over interconnection
terms between local carriers and upstarts. The guidelines required that the local carriers should only
be allowed to charge rivals for the basic cost of providing the service.
The Bells and GTE, which have long argued that the rates should also compensate them for their
"historical" investments in the networks, sued the FCC, alleging the commission had overstepped its
authority by interfering with local regulators' right to determine prices.
The 8th Circuit in St. Louis agreed, saying Congress did not clearly give the FCC the jurisdiction
to enforce national rules related to wholesale prices of local networks. Writing for the court, Judge
David R. Hansen said the provision of the law safeguarding states' authority "remains a Louisiana-built
fence that is hog tight, horse high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from intruding on the states'
intrastate turf."
The 8th Circuit also threw out several other FCC rules, including one that allowed competitors to
purchase separate components of local phone networks at lower prices, while requiring the local phone
company to "re-bundle" them into a complete service. The Supreme Court agreed yesterday to also
review the issue of rebundling and its pricing standards.
Representing the FCC, Solicitor General Seth P Waxman has argued that Congress gave the
commission pricing authority when it required it to implement within six months of the law's enactment
requirements relating to prices. The 8th Circuit said that section refers only to a deadline, not particular
authority.
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"It would be much better for us if we could play using nationwide rules," AT&T President John
Zeglis said yesterday after the court announced it would take up the appeal.
But William B. Barfield, BellSouth Corp.'s associate general counsel, said, "Different parts of the
country have different realities in terms of the costs to provide service and the federal government
should respect the jurisdiction and judgment of the states."
The cases at the Supreme Court are AT&T vs. Iowa Utilities Board; MCI vs. Iowa Utilities Board;
FCC vs. Iowa Utilities Board; Association for Local Telecom Services vs. Iowa Utilities Board;
Ameritech vs. FCC; GTE Midwest vs. FCC; U.S. West vs. FCC; and Southern New England
Telephone vs. FCC.
The consolidated case that the Supreme Court took up yesterday isn't the only legal battle over
when competition will come to local markets.
U.S. District Judge Joseph Kendall, in a Dec. 3] ruling, sided with Bell companies SBC
Communications Inc. and US West Corp., which contend that the law "punishes" them
unconstitutionally by keeping them out of the long-distance market.
The government and long-distance carriers are seeking a motion to postpone that decision, which
effectively would allow SBC, US West and Bell Atlantic (which joined the suit on Dec. 30)
immediately into the long-distance market.
Copyright 0 1998 by The Washington Post.
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SUPREME COURT EMBOLDENS FCC, NEW CLECS,
- BUT INTERCONNECTION RULING UNLIKELY BEFORE 1999
Telecommunications Reports
February 2, 1998
Volume 64, Page 5
The FCC and prospective new local market entrants earned a rare court victory-or at least a partial
victory-as the U.S. Supreme Court last week agreed to review a lower court's ruling that overturned
key provisions of the FCC's local competition rules adopted in the Common Carrier docket 96-98
"carrier interconnection" proceeding. But unless it expedites consideration, the high court won't hear
arguments on the case until the fall and likely won't render a decision until next year. That means the
short-term effects of last week's announcement may be limited.
The Supreme Court granted four petitions for certiorari (review) seeking to overturn the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit's (St. Louis) ruling in Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC (consolidated cases
beginning at 96-3321). In that case, the appeals court invalidated various provisions of the FCC's
interconnection order, including its rules on the pricing of interconnection, resale, and unbundled
network elements.
Those petitions were filed by (1) the U.S. Solicitor General (on behalf of the FCC); (2) a group of
interexchange carriers and other potential new local market entrants, led by AT&T Corp., (3) MCI
Communications Corp., and (4) a group of competitive local exchange carriers (CLECs).
The high court also granted four related "cross-petitions" from incumbent local exchange carriers
(LECs). Justice Sandra Day O'Connor didn't participate in the decisions to grant the petitions.
The primary issues the court will consider are (1) whether the FCC had the authority to issue local
exchange competition pricing rules; (2) whether the FCC could require LECs to allow requesting
carriers to "pick and choose" individual pieces of interconnection agreements for use in their own
pacts; and (3) whether the FCC could require LECs to "rebundle" unbundled network elements for
competitors.
In the short term, the telecom landscape remains unchanged. According to the Supreme Court
clerk's office, the case will be argued "in the fall" -after the court's next term begins in October. The
Eighth Circuit's ruling remains in effect pending final action by the high court. The various petitions
[] have been consolidated by the high court and given one hour for oral argument.
The case could be heard earlier, if petitioners requested and the court granted a motion for an
expedited briefing schedule. It wasn't clear last week whether any such motions would be filed. One
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attorney suggested that the court had delayed consideration of the case until the fall, against the advice
of the FCC and new local market entrants, because of the logistical complexity of handling four
petitions and four cross-petitions.
Without such an expedited briefing plan, a final decision likely won't be issued until next year. That
means state regulators will continue to hold exclusive authority over local competition pricing polices-
authority that was strengthened further by the Eighth Circuit's recent writ of mandamus barring the
FCC from using its pricing policies when reviewing Bell company applications to provide in-region
interLATA (local access and transport area) services.
CLECs See Bargaining Chip in Court's Action
Potential new local market entrants think the Supreme Court's action at least will strengthen their
bargaining position with incumbent LECs in further interconnection negotiations. The decision to hear
the case stemmed the tide of consistent court victories by the LECs, and gave new market entrants
"something to hold on to" in their negotiations, one interexchange carrier official said. That could be
increasingly important as some interconnection agreements near expiration and must be renegotiated.
The Supreme Court's pending review also could delay state regulatory action to set "permanent"
local competition pricing rules. Despite having the FCC's pricing rules overturned on jurisdictional
grounds, most state regulators have adopted interim rules that largely mirror the FCC's "forward-
looking" pricing polices.
But incumbent LECs, which have argued that such pricing policies don't let them recover all their
costs, hope that at least some states will back off "forward-looking" pricing policies once they have
the time to conduct full cost studies and investigations.
Many of those cost proceedings are under way, and some industry observers believe the Supreme
Court's decision could slow state efforts to set their own pricing rules. States may be afraid to stray
from the FCC's rules, which many have relied on as an "interim" policy, because those rules may be
reinstated as the "law of the land," one observer said.
FCC Chairman William E. Kennard said he was "very pleased" with the Supreme Court's decision
to hear the case. "The American people will reap the benefits of competition much sooner if the
Supreme Court upholds the interpretation of the Telecommunications Act urged by the FCC," he said.
Mark Rosenblum, AT&T Corp. vice president- law and public policy, said that in adopting general
pricing rules for the states to follow, the FCC "was doing exactly what Congress required and expected
under the telecom act." Jonathan B. Sallet, MCI Communications Corp.'s chief policy counsel, said,
"We believe that upon careful examination of the issues, the Supreme Court will affirm the positions
of the FCC."
Heather Burnett Gold, president of the Association for Local Telecommunications Services, said,
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"The local competition requirements in the 1996 Act are not limited to intrastate communications
services. . . Congress intended to establish a national policy that applies to both interstate and intrastate
services, with full jurisdiction to adopt and enforce pricing regulations."
The Supreme Court's decision "emphasizes the need" for the FCC to adopt LCI International, Inc.'s
"fast track" plan, said Anne K. Bingaman, president of LCI's local telecom division. That plan would
allow the Bells into in-region interLATA markets if they split their wholesale and retail operations.
"The Supreme Court will decide some critical legal questions regarding the obligations of the [Bell
companies] as required by the Telecommunications Act," Ms. Bingaman said. "But the court cannot
cure the underlying conflict of interest between [Bell companies'] wholesale and retail operations that
led us to this stalemate."
BellSouth Corp. said, "We have every confidence that the Supreme Court will uphold the Eighth
Circuit's rulings." It said it was "pleased that in deciding to review the Eighth Circuit's rulings, the
Supreme Court also agreed to review the entire issue of rebundling and the pricing
standards associated with it."
Copyright 0 1998 Telecommunications Reports International, Inc.
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COURT TO SPEED REVIEW OF RULING IN LOCAL PHONE COMPETITION CASE
The Wall Street Journal
January 13, 1998
Edward Felsenthal, Staff Reporter of The Wall Street Journal
The Supreme Court will speed its review of an appeal of a ruling that sharply limits federal
regulatory efforts to set terms on prices and connections to local phone networks.
The ruling by the U.S. appeals court in St. Louis threw out Federal Communications Commission
rules governing how local phone companies must open their networks to rivals. In a harshly written
decision, the three-judge panel said the FCC trampled on states' rights to carry out key elements of the
1996 Telecommunications Act, which was intended to deregulate the telephone industry and spur
competition in both local and long-distance service. The FCC rules are known as "interconnection"
rules because they involve the linking of long-distance carriers to local phone networks.
The lower-court decision was a big victory for local carriers, such as the Bell companies and GTE
Corp., which expect the decision to keep the FCC from imposing deep discounts on network
connections. But it was strongly opposed by long-distance carriers AT&T Corp. and MCI
Communications Corp., which appealed to the Supreme Court. The FCC also filed an appeal,
complaining in its brief that the ruling "greatly encumbered the process of opening that $100 billion
market to competition."
The justices said they would take up the appeals at their Jan. 23 conference. If they decide to hear
the case, arguments would be held this spring and a decision could be released by early summer. If the
high court hadn't accelerated the process, the case would have had little chance of being reviewed until
the fall.
Copyright @1998 by Dow Jones & Company, Inc.
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97-826 AT&T CORP. v. IOWA UTILITIES BOARD
First ruling below (Iowa Utilities Board v. FCC, CA 8, 120 F.3d 753, 66 LW 1078, as amended on
rehearing 10/14/97):
The Federal Communications Commission lacks authority to regulate prices that incumbent local
telephone exchange carriers may charge in carrying out 1996 Telecommunications Act's mandate to
offer interconnection, unbundled access, and resale services to new competitors in local
telephone market, as well as prices for transport and termination of local telecommunications traffic.
Instead, the Act confers exclusive authority on state utility commissions to determine prices that
incumbent LECs may charge for fulfilling their duties under the Act.
The FCC's 'pick and choose' rule, which permits requesting carriers to 'pick and choose' among
individual provisions of interconnection agreements previously negotiated between incumbent LECs
and other requesting carriers, without being required to accept terms and conditions of agreements in
their entirety, violates the Act.
The FCC rules that prohibit incumbent LEC from separating network elements that it may currently
combine, and that require incumbent LECs, rather than requesting carriers, to recombine network
elements that are purchased by requesting carriers on unbundled basis, violate 47 USC 251 (c)(3),
which requires incumbent LEC to provide access to elements of its network only on unbundled, rather
than combined, basis.
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IOWA UTILITIES BOARD, et al Petitioner,
V.
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION; United States of America, et al,
Respondents.
United States Court of Appeals,
Eighth Circuit.
Decided July 18, 1997
As Amended on Rehearing Oct. 14, 1997.
HANSEN, Circuit Judge.
When Alexander Graham Bell, after spilling
sulfuric acid on himself, first transmitted the
words, "Mr. Watson, come here; I want you,"
across a rudimentary phone line in 1876, he
could not have possibly imagined that his
invention would explode into the current
technologically-advanced, multi- billion dollar
telecommunications industry. Nor could he
have foreseen the amount of legislation,
regulation, and litigation that his invention
would generate.
I. Background
One hundred twenty years after Bell's
discovery, Congress passed the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (the Act),
which was designed, in part, to erode the
monopolistic nature of the local telephone
service industry by obligating the current
providers of local phone service (known as
"incumbent local exchange carriers" or
"incumbent LECs") to facilitate the entry of
competing companies into local telephone
service markets across the country.
Specifically, the Act forces an incumbent LEC
(1) to permit a requesting new entrant in the
incumbent LEC's local market to interconnect
with the incumbent LEC's existing local
network and thereby use the incumbent LEC's
network to compete with the incumbent LEC
in providing telephone services
(interconnection), (2) to provide its
competing telecommunications carriers with
access to individual elements of the incumbent
LEC's own network on an unbundled basis
(unbundled access), and (3) to sell to its
competing telecommunications carriers, at
wholesale rates, any telecommunications
service that the incumbent LEC provides to its
customers at retail rates, in order to allow the
competing carriers to resell the services
(resale). A company seeking to enter the local
telephone service market may request an
incumbent LEC to provide it with any one or
any combination of these three services.
Through these three duties, and the Act in
general, Congress sought "to promote
competition and reduce regulation in order to
secure lower prices and higher quality services
for American telecommunications consumers
and encourage the rapid deployment of new
telecommunications technologies."
Telecommunications Act of 1996.
The Act also establishes a system of
negotiations and arbitrations in order to
facilitate voluntary agreements between
incumbent LECs and competing carriers to
implement the Act's substantive requirements.
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When a competing carrier asks an incumbent
LEC to provide interconnection, unbundled
access, or resale, both the incumbent LEC and
the competing carrier have a duty to negotiate
in good faith the terms and conditions of an
agreement that accomplishes the Act's goals.
If the parties fail to reach an agreement
through voluntary negotiation, either party
may petition the respective state utility
commission to arbitrate and resolve any open
issues. The final agreement, whether
accomplished through negotiation or
arbitration, must be approved by the state
commission.
Several sections of the Act also direct the
FCC to participate in the Act's implementation.
On August 8, 1996, the FCC issued its First
Report and Order. This document contains
the Agency's findings and rules pertaining to
the local competition provisions of the Act.
Soon after the FCC released its First Report
and Order, many petitioners, consisting largely
of incumbent LECs and state utility
commissions from across the country, filed
motions to stay the First Report and Order in
whole or in part. Although most of the
petitioners requested the court to stay the
entire First Report and Order, their specific
attacks focused primarily on the FCC's rules
regarding the prices that the incumbent LECs
could charge their new competitors for
interconnection, unbundled access, and resale,
as well as on the rules regarding the prices for
the transport and termination of local
telecommunications traffic. The petitioners
argued that the FCC exceeded its jurisdiction
in establishing prices for what is essentially
local intrastate telecommunications service and
that the pricing rules violate the terms of the
Act. After the cases were consolidated in this
circuit, we decided to stay temporarily,
pending our final review, the operation and
effect of the pricing provisions and the "pick
and choose" rule found in the First Report and
Order.
In their main briefs and oral arguments, the
petitioners now renew and refine their attacks
against the Agency's pricing rules, and they
also widen the scope of their challenge to the
First Report and Order and assail additional
FCC rules, particularly the agency's non-price
regulations pertaining to the incumbent LECs'
unbundling obligations. Our review of the
extensive arguments in this case has confirmed
our initial belief that the FCC exceeded its
jurisdiction in promulgating the pricing rules
regarding local telephone service. We also
remain convinced that the FCC's "pick and
choose" rule would frustrate the Act's design
to make privately negotiated agreements the
preferred route to local telephone competition.
Our conclusions regarding the additional
challenged policies and rules in the FCC's First
Report and Order are contained throughout
the remainder of this opinion.
II. Analysis
United States Courts of Appeals have been
granted exclusive statutory jurisdiction to
review the FCC's final orders. We must defer
to administrative agency interpretations only if
they are consistent with the plain meaning of a
statute or are reasonable constructions of
ambiguous statutes. Thus, we are empowered
to overturn an agency interpretation when the
interpretation conflicts with the plain meaning
of a statute, when the interpretation is an
unreasonable construction of an ambiguous
statute, or when an agency acted arbitrarily or
capriciously in adopting its interpretation. In
this case, we emphasize at the beginning that
our review does not encompass any
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determination regarding the wisdom or
prudence of the policies Congress set forth in
the Act, those considerations being the
Constitutionally-assigned prerogatives of the
Legislative Branch of our national
government.
A. The FCC's Pricing Rules
All of the petitioners vehemently challenge
the FCC's pricing rules. Their primary target
is the FCC's mandate that state commissions
employ the "total element long-run incremental
cost" (TELRIC) method to calculate the costs
that an incumbent LEC incurs in making its
facilities available to competitors. After
applying the TELRIC method and arriving at
a cost figure, the state commissions, according
to the FCC's rules, must then determine the
price that an incumbent LEC may charge its
competitors, based on the TELRIC-driven cost
figure. The petitioners also challenge the
FCC's proxy rates, which, under the provisions
of the First Report and Order, are to be used
by the state commissions if they do not use the
TELRIC method to calculate costs. The
incumbent LECs assert that these proxy rates
also do not accurately reflect their costs and
are artificially low. The petitioners also
challenge several other FCC regulations
pertaining to the prices that the incumbent
LECs are permitted to charge for fulfilling
their new duties under the Act.
The petitioners' first line of attack against the
FCC's pricing rules is their claim that the FCC
has no jurisdiction to promulgate these rules.
They argue that the Act plainly directs state
commissions, not the FCC, to set the prices
that an incumbent LEC may charge an
incoming competitor for interconnection,
unbundled access, and resale, and also to
determine the prices for the transport and
termination of calls, when the state
commissions conduct arbitrations under the
Act. The petitioners also assert that section
2(b) of the Communications Act of 1934,
denies the FCC jurisdiction to determine these
rates because the rates involve local intrastate
communications service. The FCC and its
supporting intervenors, however, contend that
the Act clearly grants the FCC the power to
issue pricing rules regarding local telephone
service and that section 2(b) does not prevent
the Commission from having jurisdiction to
issue the pricing rules at issue here. They do
not claim that the FCC's pricing authority is
exclusive, instead, they argue that the Act
establishes shared or parallel jurisdiction
between the states and the FCC under which
the FCC is to issue general rules governing the
rate-making procedures, while the state
commissions are left to establish the actual
prices by applying the FCC's mandates. After
carefully reading the language of the Act and
fully considering and reviewing all of the
arguments, we conclude that the FCC
exceeded its jurisdiction in promulgating the
pricing rules.
I The Plain Language of Sections 251
and 252
The petitioners point to the language
contained in subsections 252(c)(2) and 252(d)
to support their claim that the Act directly
grants the state commissions the authority to
determine the rates involved in implementing
the local competition provisions of the Act.
Indeed, subsection 252(c)(2) requires a state
commission to "establish any rates for
interconnection, services, or network elements
according to subsection (d) of this section."
Meanwhile, subsection 252(d), entitled
"Pricing standards," lists the requirements that
the state commissions must meet in making
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their determinations of the appropriate rates
for interconnection, unbundled access, resale,
and transport and termination of traffic. These
statutory provisions undeniably authorize the
state commissions to determine the prices an
incumbent LEC may charge for fulfilling its
duties under the Act.
The FCC and its supporters do not contest
the fact that state commissions have the
responsibility to set prices under the Act.
Instead, they claim that subsection 251 (d)(1)
gives the FCC parallel authority to issue
regulations governing the rate-making
methods by which state commissions establish
the prices that incumbent LECs may charge
their new competitors for connecting with and
piggy-backing on the LECs' networks. They
claim that subsection 252(c)(1) requires the
state commissions to follow these FCC
mandates when they determine the actual
prices. The FCC also believes that several
general rulemaking provisions of the
Communications Act of 1934, namely
subsections 154(i), 201(b), and 303(r), provide
it with additional authority to promulgate its
pricing rules.
Despite the FCC's contentions, we are not
convinced that these provisions supply the
FCC with the authority to issue regulations
governing the pricing of the local intrastate
telecommunication services that the incumbent
LECs are now legally obligated to provide to
their new competitors. Subsection 251(d)(1)
provides that "[w]ithin 6 months after
February 8, 1996, the Commission shall
complete all actions necessary to establish
regulations to implement the requirements of
this section." The FCC believes this provision
supplies the Agency with overarching plenary
authority to regulate all aspects of section 251
and reasons that because subsection 251(c)
requires rates for interconnection, unbundled
access, and collocation to be "just, reasonable,
and nondiscriminatory," the FCC has the
power to regulate these rates and any other
rates mentioned in section 251. We are not
persuaded by the FCC's interpretation. We
believe that subsection 251(d)(1) operates
primarily as a time constraint, directing the
Commission to complete expeditiously its
rulemaking regarding only the areas in section
251 where Congress expressly called for the
FCC's involvement. Nowhere in section 251
is the FCC authorized specifically to issue
rules governing the rates for interconnection,
unbundled access, and resale, and the transport
and termination of telecommunications traffic.
The Commission's reliance on general
rulemaking provisions that predate the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 also fares no
better. While subsection 201(b) does grant the
FCC jurisdiction over charges regarding
communications services, those services are
expressly limited to interstate or foreign
communications services by subsection 20 1(a).
Consequently, subsection 201(b) does not
provide the Commission with the authority to
regulate the rates of local intrastate phone
service and neither do subsections 154(i) or
303(r). Both of these subsections merely
supply the FCC with ancillary authority to
issue regulations that may be necessary to
fulfill its primary directives contained
elsewhere in the statute. Neither subsection
confers additional substantive authority on the
FCC. Thus, we conclude that none of the
statutory provisions relied on by the FCC
supply it with jurisdiction over the pricing of
local telephone service.
The absence of any direct FCC pricing
authority over local telephone service is fatal
to the Agency's theory that the Act requires
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the state commissions to share such local
pricing authority with the FCC. While
subsection 252(c)(1) does require the state
commissions to ensure that their resolutions of
arbitrated disputes comply with both section
251 and with the FCC's regulations made
pursuant to section 251, as explained above,
no provision in section 251 authorizes the FCC
to regulate the rates of local phone service.
Moreover, the absence of any reference
whatsoever to the FCC in the sections of the
Act that directly authorize the state
commissions to establish prices confirms to us
that Congress did not envision the FCC's
participation in determining the prices that the
incumbent LECs will be able to charge for
opening their networks to new entrants.
Subsection 252(c)(2) commands state
commissions to "establish any rates for
interconnection, services, or network
elements" and it requires them to follow only
the standards in subsection (d). In turn,
subsection 252(d) refers exclusively to the
determinations by state commissions of the
just and reasonable rates, and it provides
statutory standards for the state commissions
to follow when setting the rates, thus negating
any need for additional FCC-mandated rate-
making standards or guidelines.
2. Section 2(b) and the Impossibility
Exception
Any ambiguity regarding the FCC's vacuum of
authority over local telecommunications
pricing under the Act is resolved by the
operation of section 2(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934. Section 2(b)
provides that "nothing in this chapter shall be
construed to apply or to give the [FCC]
jurisdiction with respect to ... charges,
classifications, practices, services, facilities, or
regulations for or in connection with intrastate
communications service." We believe that the
prices that incumbent local exchange carriers
may charge their new competitors for
interconnection, unbundled access, and
resale- the services and facilities that will
enable the competitors to provide competing
local telecommunications service--as well as
the rates for the transport and termination of
telecommunication traffic qualify as "charges
... for or in connection with intrastate
communications service." In Louisiana Pub.
Serv. Comm'n v. FCC, the Supreme Court
explained that section 2(b) "fences off'
intrastate matters from FCC regulation. The
FCC and its supporting intervenors attempt to
slip through the fence by arguing that this case
qualifies as an exception to the operation of
section 2(b).
The Supreme Court emphasized that section
2(b) constitutes an explicit congressional
denial of power to the FCC and suggested that
Congress could override section 2(b)'s
command only by unambiguously granting the
FCC authority over intrastate
telecommunications matters or by directly
modifying section 2(b). The only other gate
through the 2(b) fence is the "impossibility"
exception, which has evolved out of the
Court's opinion in Louisiana. This quite
narrow exception provides that the FCC may
preempt state regulation of intrastate
telecommunications matters only when (1) it is
impossible to separate the interstate and
intrastate components of the FCC regulation
and (2) the state regulation would negate the
FCC's lawful authority over interstate
communication. The FCC and its supporting
intervenors assert that the terms of the Act
supply the Commission with a direct grant of
intrastate pricing authority sufficient to
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overcome the operation of section 2(b).
Alternatively, they argue that the impossibility
exception removes section 2(b) as a barrier to
the FCC's pricing rules. We are not convinced
by the respondents' arguments here, and we
believe that the 1996 Act, when coupled with
section 2(b), mandates that the states have the
exclusive authority to establish the prices
regarding the local competition provisions of
the Act.
As explained earlier, the FCC argues that
Congress unambiguously granted it intrastate
pricing authority through the relationship
between subsections 251(d)(1) and 251(c).
We have now rejected this interpretation as
being inconsistent with the plain meaning of
the Act, and we have concluded exactly the
opposite- that the Act directly and
straightforwardly assigns to the states the
authority to set the prices regarding the local
competition provisions of the Act in
subsections 252(c)(2) and 252(d).
Consequently, the FCC's interpretation of the
Act does not demonstrate an unambiguous
grant of intrastate authority to the FCC
required either to jump over or pass through
section 2(b)'s fence.
Faced with the absence of such an
unambiguous grant of intrastate pricing
authority to the FCC, the Commission and its
supporting intervenors resort to arguing that
section 2(b) is easily overcome whenever a
federal statute's terms unambiguously apply to
intrastate telecommunication matters, because
they believe the FCC has plenary authority to
implement all such federal statutory
requirements. They believe that the Louisiana
decision supports their proposition that section
2(b) prevents only the FCC's ancillary
jurisdiction from extending into intrastate
areas, but that it does not limit the federal
Commission's primary jurisdiction, which, they
argue, presumably extends as far as the reach
of a federal communications statute. We do
not believe that section 2(b) is limited in this
manner, nor do we think the Supreme Court's
decision in Louisiana stands for such a far-
reaching proposition.
Although the Court's decision in Louisiana
focused on whether section 220(b) of the
Communications Act of 1934 itself applied to
intrastate telecommunication matters, it did so
only because section 220 undeniably directed
the FCC to administer the depreciation
calculations required by the statute. In other
words, we believe that the Louisiana decision
indicates that in order to qualify for the
"unambiguous" exception to section 2(b), a
statute must both unambiguously apply to
intrastate telecommunication matters and
unambiguously direct the FCC to implement
its provisions. In Louisiana, section 220(b)
clearly passed the second prong but failed to
meet the first prong. In the present case, we
have the opposite situation: the pricing
provisions of sections 251 and 252 clearly
apply to intrastate telecommunication service,
but they do not unambiguously call for the
FCC's participation in setting the rates. To the
contrary, the Act specifically calls for the state
commissions, not the FCC, to determine the
rates for interconnection, unbundled access,
resale, and transport and termination of traffic.
Consequently, we reject the FCC's contention
that its rulemaking authority is coextensive
with the reach of every provision of a federal
statute involving telecommunications. Section
2(b) is not a limit on Congress's ability to
legislate in the area of intrastate
telecommunications, it is, however, a limit on
the FCC's ability to regulate in the area of
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intrastate telecommunications. Thus, a federal
statute's mere application to intrastate
telecommunication matters is insufficient to
confer intrastate jurisdiction upon the FCC,
the statute must also directly grant the FCC
such intrastate authority in order to overcome
the operation of section 2(b).
The respondents' last chance to breach the
section 2(b) fence lies with the "impossibility"
exception to section 2(b). As mentioned
above, the impossibility exception allows an
FCC regulation to preempt a state regulation
when it is impossible to separate the interstate
and intrastate components of the asserted FCC
regulation and the state regulation would
negate the FCC's authority over interstate
communication.
We believe that this exception does not apply
to the circumstances of this case and thus does
not give the FCC the authority to dictate
pricing regulations governing the local
competition provisions of the Act. First,
telecommunication rate-making traditionally
has been capable of being separated into its
interstate and intrastate components. In fact,
other statutory provisions predating the 1996
Act require such separation to occur and
command a joint board of federal and state
regulators to execute the separations process.
Second, and more importantly, the FCC has
not demonstrated that the states' authority to
establish the rates in connection with the local
competition provisions of the Act would
negate any valid authority the Commission has
over interstate communications or impede any
of its interstate regulatory goals. The
impossibility exception is premised on a
preemption analysis, and "[t]he critical
question in any pre-emption analysis is always
whether Congress intended that federal
regulation supersede state law."
Consequently, our inquiry returns to the
language of the Act. As illustrated above, the
terms of the Act clearly indicate that Congress
did not intend for the FCC to issue any pricing
rules, let alone preempt state pricing rules
regarding the local competition provisions of
the Act. Because the Act clearly grants the
states the authority to set the rates for
interconnection, unbundled access, resale, and
transport and termination of traffic, the FCC
has no valid pricing authority over these areas
of new localized competition for the states to
negate. "An agency may not act at all, let
alone preempt state authority, in an area where
Congress has explicitly denied it jurisdiction."
NARUC, 800 F.2d at 428. The fact that there
are specific statutory provisions that expressly
indicate that the states have the authority to
determine the rates for these local
telecommunications services distinguishes this
case from all of the cases that invoke the
impossibility exception to allow the FCC to
preempt state regulations. Because none of
the courts invoking the impossibility exception
had the assistance of a federal statute that
specifically determined who had jurisdiction
over the telecommunications area at issue,
those courts had to resort to analyzing the
interstate/intrastate character of the
telecommunications services, as required by
sections 151 and 152 of the Communications
Act, in order to make such a determination.
Here, however, subsections 252(c)(2) and
252(d) clearly assign jurisdiction over the rates
for the local competition provisions of the Act
to the state commissions, thus avoiding the
need to analyze the interstate/intrastate
character of these services.
Even a traditional analysis of the
interstate/intrastate quality of the local
competition provisions of the Act reveals that
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these functions (i.e., interconnection,
unbundled access, resale, and transport and
termination of traffic) are fundamentally
intrastate in character; thus the FCC's
traditional jurisdiction over interstate
communications will not be negated by the
states' regulation of the rates for these
services. The Act primarily focuses on
facilitating competition in local telephone
service markets by imposing several new
duties (interconnection, unbundled access, and
resale--the local competition provisions) on
incumbent local exchange carriers. Allowing
competing telecommunications carriers to have
direct access to an incumbent local exchange
carrier's established network in order to enable
the new carrier to provide competing general
local telephone services is an intrastate activity
even though the local network thus invaded is
sometimes used to originate or complete
interstate calls. Contrary to the respondents'
contentions, section 2(b) does not prevent the
FCC from having jurisdiction only over
matters that are purely intrastate. The
Supreme Court rejected such a position in its
decision in Louisiana.
Moreover, we reiterate that the text of
section 2(b) itself indicates that the FCC does
not have jurisdiction over matters "in
connection with" intrastate service. Con-
sequently, the fact that the local competition
provisions of the Act may have a tangential
impact on interstate services is not sufficient to
overcome the operation of section 2(b) and
does not alter the fundamentally intrastate
nature of the Act's local competition
provisions. We note that the Act's clear grant
of rate-making authority to the state
commissions is entirely consistent with the
states' historical role in telecommunications
regulation, given the intrastate quality of the
local competition provisions of the Act.
Because the impossibility exception does not
apply in this case, section 2(b) remains a
Louisiana built fence that is hog tight, horse
high, and bull strong, preventing the FCC from
intruding on the states' intrastate turf. Having
concluded that the FCC lacks jurisdiction to
issue the pricing rules, we vacate the FCC's
pricing rules on that ground alone and choose
not to review these rules on their merits.
B. The FCC's "Pick and Choose" Rule
The petitioners next assert that the FCC's so-
called "pick and choose" rule, is an
unreasonable interpretation of subsection
252(i). Subsection 252(i) provides:
A local exchange carrier shall make available
any interconnection, service, or network
element provided under an agreement
approved under this section to which it is a
party to any other requesting
telecommunications carrier upon the same
terms and conditions as those provided in
the agreement.
With its "pick and choose" rule, the FCC
interpreted this section of the Act to allow
requesting carriers to "pick and choose"
among individual provisions of other
interconnection agreements that have
previously been negotiated between an
incumbent LEC and other requesting carriers
without being required to accept the terms and
conditions of the agreements in their entirety.
The petitioners argue that such a rule is
unduly burdensome on incumbent LECs and
that it will thwart negotiations because it
allows a later entrant to select the favorable
terms of a prior approved agreement without
being bound by the corresponding tradeoffs
that were made in exchange for the favorable
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provisions sought by the new entrant. The
petitioners assert that subsection 252(i) allows
requesting carriers the option to select the
terms and conditions of prior agreements only
as a whole, not in a piecemeal fashion.
Contrary to the FCC's belief that subsection
252(i) plainly mandates its approach, we think
that the language of subsection 252(i) in
isolation does not clearly reveal Congress's
intent on this issue. Consequently, we "must
look to the structure and language of the
statute as a whole" to determine if the FCC's
interpretation of this ambiguous provision is a
reasonable one. Our analysis leads us to
conclude that the FCC's rule conflicts with the
Act's design to promote negotiated binding
agreements.
The structure of the Act reveals the
Congress's preference for voluntarily
negotiated interconnection agreements
between incumbent LECs and their
competitors over arbitrated agreements.
Voluntary negotiation is the first method listed
under section 252, and the Act indicates that
the parties may begin negotiations as soon as
an entrant submits a request to an incumbent
LEC. Meanwhile, the parties' ability to
request the arbitration of an agreement is
confined to the period from the 135th to the
160th day after the requesting carrier submits
its request to the incumbent LEC. These
provisions reveal that the Act establishes a
preference for incumbent LECs and requesting
carriers to reach agreements independently and
that the Act establishes state-run arbitrations
to act as a backstop or impasse-resolving
mechanism for failed negotiations.
The FCC's "pick and choose" rule, however,
would thwart the negotiation process and
preclude the attainment of binding negotiated
agreements. During a negotiation, an
incumbent LEC would be very reluctant to
make a concession on one term in exchange
for a benefit on another term when faced with
the prospect that a subsequent competing
carrier will be able to receive the concession
without having to grant the incumbent the
corresponding benefit. In this manner, the
FCC's rule would discourage the give-and-take
process that is essential to successful
negotiations. Moreover, negotiated
agreements will, in reality, not be binding,
because, according to the FCC, an entrant who
is an original party to an agreement may
unilaterally incorporate more advantageous
provisions contained in subsequent agreements
negotiated by other carriers. This result
conflicts with the Act's requirement that
agreements be "binding," and is an additional
impediment to subsequent negotiations,
because an incumbent LEC will be even more
hesitant to make concessions in subsequent
negotiations when it knows that such
concessions would be available to all of the
competing carriers with which it previously
had agreements.
In response to these arguments, the FCC
points to the waiver provision of the "pick and
choose" rule, and asserts that incumbent LECs
will not be so deterred from making
concessions because the waiver provision
prevents an entrant from adopting the
provisions of a previous agreement when an
incumbent LEC can persuade a state
commission that such adoption would be
economically burdensome or technically
infeasible. We do not believe, however, that
the incumbent LECs can take solace in the
waiver provision. With the burden of proof
placed on the incumbent LECs, receiving an
actual waiver would be an uphill battle that
would likely be a rare occurrence. We remain
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convinced that even in light of the possibility
that an exemption could be granted, the
incumbent LECs' ability and willingness to
negotiate would be severely stifled by the
FCC's "pick and choose" rule.
D. FCC Authority Under Section 208
In the discussion section of its First Report
and Order, the FCC claims that its general
authority to hear complaints under 47 U.S.C.
§ 208 empowers it to review agreements
approved by state commissions under the Act
and to enforce the terms of such agreements as
well as the actual provisions contained in
sections 251 and 252. The Commission's
perception of its authority under section 208 is
untenable, however, in light of the language
and structure of the Act and by the operation
of section 2(b).
As an initial matter, the FCC argues that the
issue of its complaint authority under section
208 is not ripe for review, because it did not
promulgate an actual rule regarding this
subject and it would be difficult to determine
the actual boundaries of state and federal
authority in an abstract setting. Despite the
FCC's contentions, we believe that the issue is
ripe for review. Congress has granted the
courts of appeals jurisdiction to review all final
orders of the FCC under 28 U.S.C. § 2342(1)
and 47 U.S.C. § 402(a). The fact that the
FCC asserts its section 208 authority in the
commentary section of its First Report and
Order as opposed to stating its position as a
rule is immaterial to our determination of
ripeness. Instead, we focus on whether the
agency's action is final, which requires us to
determine if "the agency has completed its
decisionmaking process." In paragraphs 127
and 128, the FCC definitively states that its
authority to hear complaints under section 208
extends to disputes over the implementation of
the requirements of sections 251 and 252.
This statement and the contrary conclusions of
several of the petitioners present us with
conflicting interpretations of the statutory
scheme's allocation of jurisdiction. This is a
legal question that is ripe for our review.
The language and design of the Act indicate
that the FCC's authority under section 208
does not enable the Commission to review
state commission determinations or to enforce
the terms of interconnection agreements under
the Act. Instead, subsection 252(e)(6) directly
provides for federal district court review of
state commission determinations when parties
wish to challenge such determinations. The
FCC responds by arguing that federal district
court review under subsection 252(e)(6) is not
the exclusive remedy for a party aggrieved by
state commission decisions under the Act and
that such a party has the option of also filing a
section 208 complaint with the FCC. Although
the terms of subsection 252(e)(6) do not
explicitly state that federal district court
review is a party's "exclusive" remedy, courts
traditionally presume that such special
statutory review procedures are intended to be
the exclusive means of review. We afford
subsection 252(e)(6) our traditional
presumption and conclude that it is the
exclusive means to attain review of state
commission determinations under the Act.
Additionally, the complete absence of any
reference to section 208 in the Act bolsters our
conclusion that Congress did not intend to
allow the FCC to review the decisions of state
commissions.
We also believe that state commissions retain
the primary authority to enforce the
substantive terms of the agreements made
pursuant to sections 251 and 252. Subsection
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252(e)(1) of the Act explicitly requires all
agreements under the Act to be submitted for
state commission approval. We believe that
the state commissions' plenary authority to
accept or reject these agreements necessarily
carries with it the authority to enforce the
provisions of agreements that the state
commissions have approved. Moreover, the
state commissions' enforcement power extends
to ensuring that parties comply with the
regulations that the FCC is specifically
authorized to issue under the Act, because the
Act empowers state commissions to reject
arbitrated agreements on the basis that they
violate the FCC's regulations. Again, we
believe that the power to approve or reject
these agreements based on the FCC's
requirements includes the power to enforce
those requirements. Significantly, nothing in
the Act even suggests that the FCC has the
authority to enforce the terms of negotiated or
arbitrated agreements or the general provisions
of sections 251 and 252. The only grant of
any review or enforcement authority to the
FCC is contained in subsection 252(e)(5), and
this provision authorizes the FCC to act only
if a state commission fails to fulfill its duties
under the Act. The FCC's expansive view of its
authority under section 208 is thus
contradicted by the language, structure, and
design of the Act.
F. § 25 1(d)(3) and State Compliance With
FCC Rules
In the commentary portion of the First
Report and Order, the FCC asserts that "the
Commission's regulations under section 251
are binding on the states, even with respect to
intrastate matters." With this statement, as
well as several others, the FCC purports to
preempt any state policy that conflicts with an
FCC regulation promulgated pursuant to
section 251. The petitioners argue that the
FCC's position is untenable in light of
subsection 251(d)(3) and the structure of the
Act. We agree.
Subsection 25 1(d)(3), entitled "Preservation
of State access regulations," provides the
following:
In prescribing and enforcing regulations to
implement the requirements of this section,
the Commission shall not preclude the
enforcement of any regulation, order, or
policy of a State commission that--
(A) establishes access and interconnection
obligations of local exchange carriers,
(B) is consistent with the requirements of
this section, and
(C) does not substantially prevent
implementation of the requirements of this
section and the purposes of this part.
Initially, we note that the FCC's authority to
prescribe and enforce regulations to implement
the requirements of section 251 is confined to
the six areas in this section where Congress
expressly called for the FCC's participation.
Subsection 251(d)(3) further constrains the
FCC's authority. Even when the FCC issues
rules pursuant to its valid rulemaking authority
under section 251, subsection 251(d)(3)
prevents the FCC from preempting a state
commission order that establishes access and
interconnection obligations so long as the state
commission order (i) is consistent with the
requirements of section 251 and (ii) does not
substantially prevent the implementation of the
requirements of section 251 and the purposes
of Part 1I, which consists of sections 251
through 261. This provision does not require
all state commission orders to be consistent
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with all of the FCC's regulations promulgated
under section 251. The FCC attempts to read
such a requirement into this subsection by
asserting that a state policy that is inconsistent
with an FCC regulation is necessarily also
inconsistent with the terms of section 251 and
substantially prevents the implementation of
section 251. The FCC's conflation of the
requirements of section 251 with its own
regulations is unwarranted and illogical. It is
entirely possible for a state interconnection or
access regulation, order, or policy to vary from
a specific FCC regulation and yet be consistent
with the overarching terms of section 251 and
not substantially prevent the implementation of
section 251 or Part II. In this circumstance,
subsection 25 1(d)(3) would prevent the FCC
from preempting such a state rule, even though
it differed from an FCC regulation.
The FCC asserts that other provisions of the
Act justify its belief that state interconnection
and access rules must be consistent with the
Commission's regulations under section 251.
The FCC claims that section 253 and
subsections 252(c)(1) and 261(c) indicate that
state commissions are bound by the FCC's
regulations. While subsection 253(d) does
empower the Commission to preempt some
state policies, those state policies are limited to
those that violate the terms of subsections
253(a) or 253(b). Neither subsection 253(a)
nor 253(b) requires state policies to conform
to any Commission regulations; 253(a) merely
requires state policies not to prohibit "the
ability of any entity to provide any interstate or
intrastate telecommunications service," and
253(b) allows states to impose additional
telecommunications requirements as long as
they are competitively neutral and consistent
with the universal service obligations of
section 254. Meanwhile, subsection 252(c)(1)
does require state commissions to ensure that
arbitrated agreements comply with the
Commission's regulations made pursuant to
section 251, but by its very terms this
provision confines the states only when they
are fulfilling their roles as arbitrators of
agreements pursuant to the federal
Telecommunications Act of 1996. This
provision does not apply to state statutes or
regulations that are independent from the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. Many
states enacted legislation designed to open up
local telephone markets to competition prior
to the 1996 federal Act, and subsection
251 (d)(3) was designed to preserve such work
of the states.
Finally, the FCC claims that subsection
261(c) provides support for its conclusion that
the state regulations must be consistent with
the Commission's rules on interconnection and
access promulgated under section 25 1. While
subsection 261(c) does require some state
rules to be consistent with "the Commission's
regulations to implement this part," we believe
that this provision applies only to those
additional state requirements that are not
promulgated pursuant to section 251 or any
other section in Part II of the Act. Because
subsection 25 1(d)(3) specifically governs state
rules that "establish[ ] access and
interconnection obligations of local exchange
carriers," which is the heart of the subject
matter of section 25 1, and subsection 261(b)
governs state rules that are issued to "fulfill[ ]
the requirements of this part," we conclude
that the additional state requirements
referenced in subsection 261(c) refer to
separate state rules that do not directly pertain
to the matters found in sections 251 through
261 (Part 11) of the Act. Consequently, this
provision does not apply to the state rules
pertaining to interconnection and access
obligations that the Commission believes it has
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the power to preempt under its section 251
authority, and thus, it does not support the
FCC's view that such state rules must conform
to the Commission's regulations.
The FCC's blanket statement that state rules
must be consistent with the Commission's
regulations promulgated pursuant to section
251 is not supportable in light of subsection
251(d)(3). With subsection 251(d)(3),
Congress intended to preserve the states'
traditional authority to regulate local telephone
markets and meant to shield state access and
interconnection orders from FCC preemption
so long as the state rules are consistent with
the requirements of section 251 and do not
substantially prevent the implementation of
section 251 or the purposes of Part II. We
conclude that the FCC's belief that merely an
inconsistency between a state rule and a
Commission regulation under section 251 is
sufficient for the FCC to preempt the state
rule, is an unreasonable interpretation of the
statute in light of subsection 251(d)(3) and the
structure of the Act..
G. The FCC's Unbundling Rules
The FCC issued many rules purporting to
implement the incumbent LECs' duties to
provide unbundled access to the incumbent
LECs' network under subsection 251(c)(3).
The petitioners challenge these rules on
multiple grounds ranging from assertions that
particular rules violate the terms of the Act to
claims that these rules altogether effect an
unconstitutional taking of the incumbent LECs'
property. We address these challenges to the
FCC's unbundling rules one by one.
1. The Unbundling Rules in Light of the
Terms of the Act
a. OSS, Operator Services, and Vertical
Switching Features
Many of the petitioners claim that the FCC's
decision to require incumbent LECs to provide
competitors with unbundled access to
operational support systems (OSS), operator
services and directory assistance, and vertical
switching features such as caller ID., call
forwarding, and call waiting, unduly expands
the incumbent LECs' unbundling obligations
beyond the statutory requirements. After
reviewing the relevant provisions of the Act,
we believe that the FCC reasonably concluded
that these features qualify as network elements
that are subject to the unbundling requirements
of the Act.
b. Definition of "Technically Feasible"-
Rule 51.5
Subsections 251(c)(2) and 251(c)(3) direct
interconnection and unbundled access to occur
"at any technically feasible point." In its
definition of "technically feasible," the FCC
states, "A determination of technical feasibility
does not include consideration of economic,
accounting, billing, space, or site concerns...."
One petitioner claims that the FCC's exclusion
of economic concerns from such
determinations is unreasonable. The petitioner
fears that ignoring the economic costs of
points of interconnection or unbundled access
could result in incumbent LECs having to
incur unwarranted expenses in order to meet
the demands of competing carriers seeking
access to their networks. We, however,
believe that the FCC's definition of "technically
feasible" is reasonable and entitled to
deference. Although economic concerns are
not to be considered in determining if a point
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of interconnection or unbundled access is
technically feasible, the costs of such
interconnection or unbundled access will be
taken into account when determining the just
and reasonable rates, terms, and conditions for
these services. Under the Act, an incumbent
LEC will recoup the costs involved in
providing interconnection and unbundled
access from the competing carriers making
these requests. Consequently, we conclude
that the FCC's definition of "technically
feasible" will not unduly burden the incumbent
LECs, and we uphold the Commission's
definition.
c. Technically Feasible and the Presumption
for Unbundling
Many petitioners also challenge the FCC's
general standards that it proposes be used in
determining what network elements must be
unbundled. One such standard is the FCC's
belief that incumbent LECs presumably must
provide unbundled access to "all network
elements for which it is technically feasible to
provide access on an unbundled basis." A
finding that it is technically feasible to
unbundle a particular element creates a
presumption that the element must be
unbundled according to the FCC. Although we
just upheld the Commission's definition of the
term "technically feasible," we reject the
Commission's use of this term to determine
what elements must be unbundled. As
mentioned above, subsection 25 1(c)(3) places
a duty on incumbent LECs to provide "access
to network elements on an unbundled basis at
any technically feasible point." By its very
terms, this provision only indicates where
unbundled access may occur, not which
elements must be unbundled. Subsection
25 1(d)(2) establishes the standards to
determine which elements must be unbundled,
and this subsection makes no reference to
technical feasibility. We think that the FCC's
interpretation that an element for which
unbundling is technically feasible must
presumably be unbundled is contrary to the
plain meaning of the Act and cannot stand.
d. The "Necessary" and "Impair" Standards
While subsection 251 (d)(2) does not mention
technical feasibility as a relevant factor in
determining what network elements should be
unbundled, it does require the Commission to
consider whether access to a network element
that is proprietary in nature is "necessary" and
whether the failure to provide access to a
network element would "impair the ability of
the telecommunications carrier seeking access
to provide the services that it seeks to offer."
47 U.S.C.A. § 251(d)(2)(A), (B). The
petitioners argue that the FCC's view of these
standards is so broad that it essentially reads
these requirements out of the statute. We
disagree and believe the Commission
reasonably interpreted these standards.
e. Superior Quality-Rules 51.305(a)(4),
51.3 11(c)
Another source of disagreement between the
petitioners and the FCC arises over the
Agency's decision to require incumbent LECs
to provide interconnection, unbundled network
elements, and access to such elements at levels
of quality that are superior to those levels at
which the incumbent LECs provide these
services to themselves, if requested to do so by
competing carriers. Here, we believe that the
FCC violated the plain terms of the Act when
it issued these rules.
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Subsection 25 1(c)(2)(C) requires incumbent
LECs to provide interconnection "that is at
least equal in quality to that provided by the
local exchange carrier to itself..." Plainly, the
Act does not require incumbent LECs to
provide its competitors with superior quality
interconnection. Likewise, subsection
251(c)(3) does not mandate that requesting
carriers receive superior quality access to
network elements upon demand. The FCC
argues that the terms "at least equal in quality"
permit the provision of superior quality
interconnection; it believes that the
nondiscrimination requirements in both
subsections 251(c)(2) and 251(c)(3) require
incumbent LECs to provide superior quality
interconnection and network elements when
requested; and it asserts that the provision of
superior quality interconnection and network
elements will not unduly burden the incumbent
LECs, because the requesting carriers will
have to pay for these services. We are not
convinced by the Commission's justifications
for these rules.
While the phrase "at least equal in quality"
leaves open the possibility that incumbent
LECs may agree to provide interconnection
that is superior in quality when the parties are
negotiating agreements under the Act, this
phrase mandates only that the quality be
equal- not superior. In other words, it
establishes a floor below which the quality of
the interconnection may not go. Because the
Commission's rule requires superior quality
interconnection when requested, the rule is not
supported by the Act's language. We also
agree with the petitioners' view that subsection
25 1(c)(3) implicitly requires unbundled access
only to an incumbent LEC's existing network--
not to a yet unbuilt superior one. Additionally,
the nondiscrimination requirements contained
in these subsections of the Act do not justify
these FCC rules. The fact that interconnection
and unbundled access must be provided on
rates, terms, and conditions that are
nondiscriminatory merely prevents an
incumbent LEC from arbitrarily treating some
of its competing carriers differently than
others; it does not mandate that incumbent
LECs cater to every desire of every requesting
carrier. Finally, the fact that incumbent LECs
may be compensated for the additional cost
involved in providing superior quality
interconnection and unbundled access does not
alter the plain meaning of the statute, which, as
we have shown, does not impose such a
burden on the incumbent LECs. Therefore, we
conclude that sections 51.305(a)(4) and
5 1.3 11(c) cannot stand in light of the plain
terms of the Act.
f Combination of Network Elements
We also believe that the FCC's rule requiring
incumbent LECs, rather than the requesting
carriers, to recombine network elements that
are purchased by the requesting carriers on an
unbundled basis, cannot be squared with the
terms of subsection 251(c)(3). The last
sentence of subsection 251(c)(3) reads, "An
incumbent local exchange carrier shall provide
such unbundled network elements in a manner
that allows requesting carriers to combine such
elements in order to provide such
telecommunications service." This sentence
unambiguously indicates that requesting
carriers will combine the unbundled elements
themselves. While the Act requires incumbent
LECs to provide elements in a manner that
enables the competing carriers to combine
them, unlike the Commission, we do not
believe that this language can be read to levy a
duty on the incumbent LECs to do the actual
combining of elements. The FCC and its
supporting intervenors argue that because the
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incumbent LECs maintain control over their
networks it is necessary to force them to
combine the network elements, and they
believe that the incumbent LECs would prefer
to do the combining themselves to prevent the
competing carriers from interfering with their
networks. Despite the Commission's
arguments, the plain meaning of the Act
indicates that the requesting carriers will
combine the unbundled elements themselves;
the Act does not require the incumbent LECs
to do all of the work. Moreover, the fact that
the incumbent LECs object to this rule
indicates to us that they would rather allow
entrants access to their networks than have to
rebundle the unbundled elements for them.
Section 25 1(c)(3) requires an incumbent LEC
to provide access to the elements of its
network only on an unbundled (as opposed to
a combined) basis. Stated another way, §
251(c)(3) does not permit a new entrant to
purchase the incumbent LEC's assembled
platform(s) of combined network elements (or
any lesser existing combination of two or more
elements) in order to offer competitive
telecommunications services. To permit such
an acquisition of already combined elements at
cost based rates for unbundled access would
obliterate the careful distinctions Congress has
drawn in subsections 251(c)(3) and (4)
between access to unbundled network
elements on the one hand and the purchase at
wholesale rates of an incumbent's
telecommunications retail services for resale
on the other. Accordingly, the Commission's
rule, which prohibits an incumbent LEC from
separating network elements that it may
currently combine, is contrary to § 251 (c)(3)
because the rule would permit the new entrant
access to the incumbent LEC's network
elements on a bundled rather than an
unbundled basis.
Consequently, we vacate rule 51.3 15(b)-(f)
as well as the affiliated discussion sections.
g. Obtaining Finished Services Through
Unbundled Access
The petitioners next engage in a broad-based
attack on the bulk of the FCC's unbundling
rules by arguing that the Commission's
conclusion that the requesting carriers may
obtain the ability to provide finished
telecommunications services entirely by
acquiring access to the unbundled elements of
an incumbent LEC's network violates the
terms and structure of the Act. The petitioners
contend that while subsection 25 1(c)(3) allows
new entrants access to an incumbent LEC's
network elements on an unbundled basis, it
does not enable new entrants to provide
telecommunications services to the public
entirely by acquiring all of the necessary
elements on an unbundled basis from an
incumbent LEC. The petitioners assert that a
competing carrier should own or control some
of its own local exchange facilities before it
can purchase and use unbundled elements from
an incumbent LEC to provide a
telecommunications service. The petitioners
argue that subsection 251 (c)(4) makes resale
the exclusive means to offer finished
telecommunications services for competing
carriers that do not own or control any portion
of a telecommunications network.
Furthermore, the petitioners point out that
under subsection 25 1 (c)(4) a competing carrier
may purchase the right to resell a
telecommunications service from an incumbent
LEC only at wholesale rates. Under subsection
252(d)(1), however, a competing carrier may
obtain unbundled access to an incumbent
LEC's network elements at a less expensive
cost-based rate. The petitioners then argue
that by allowing a competing carrier to obtain
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the ability to provide finished
telecommunications services entirely through
unbundled access at the less expensive cost-
based rate, the FCC enables competing carriers
to circumvent the more expensive wholesale
rates that the Act requires for
telecommunications services, and thereby
nullifies the terms of subsection 25 1(c)(4).
Additionally, the petitioners claim that by
being able to obtain the ability to provide
services at cost under subsection 251(c)(3),
competing carriers will be able to capture
many of the incumbent LECs' customers to
whom the incumbent LECs are expected to
charge high prices for certain services to offset
the low prices incumbent LECs are required to
charge other customers in order to promote
universal service. The petitioners claim that
the competing carriers will simply offer the
same services to these particular customers at
lower rates and capture a significant share of
the market ("cherry-picking") without
achieving any true gain in efficiency or
technology. Finally, the petitioners contend
that the FCC's view of subsection 251(c)(3)
allows carriers to circumvent the Act's
restriction on joint marketing of local and
long-distance services contained in subsection
271(e)(1). This is because subsection
271(e)(1) prohibits a carrier's joint marketing
only of local service obtained under subsection
251 (c)(4) (resale) with the carrier's ability to
provide long-distance service. It does not
apply to local service that a competing carrier
achieves under subsection 25 1(c)(3)
(unbundled access). Despite the petitioners'
extensive arguments to the contrary, we
believe that the FCC's determination that a
competing carrier may obtain the ability to
provide telecommunications services entirely
through an incumbent LEC's unbundled
network elements is reasonable, especially in
light of our decisions regarding the validity of
other specific FCC rules.
2. The Unbundling Rules and the Purpose
of the Act
Several of the petitioners vaguely argue that
the FCC's unbundling rules in combination
provide competing carriers with such extensive
access to the incumbent LECs' networks that
they will thwart the Act's principal purpose,
which, according to the petitioners, is to
promote facilities-based competition and
innovation in telecommunications technology.
The petitioners claim that under these rules,
competing carriers will have no incentive to
construct their own facilities because they will
be able to earn substantial profits by relying
entirely on the incumbent LECs' networks to
provide services to their customers. They also
assert that neither the competing carriers nor
the incumbent LECs will attempt to innovate
their technology because the Commission's
supposedly broad unbundling rules force a
carrier to share such advances in technology
with its competitors. We reject these claims
and believe that the Commission's rules that
we have found to be consistent with the terms
of the Act are also consistent with the purpose
of the Act.
Initially we note that the petitioners'
arguments are generally based on the
assumption that the FCC's unbundling rules
would operate in conjunction with the
Commission's proposed pricing rules. The
petitioners have argued that the Commission's
pricing rules would result in rates that are
unreasonably low, making it inexpensive and
thus highly profitable for competing carriers to
provide local telecommunications services
exclusively through the use of an incumbent
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LEC's network. In these circumstances, the
petitioners argue, competing carriers would
have no incentive to build their own network
facilities. We have, however, vacated the
FCC's pricing rules and determined that the
Act requires state commissions to set the rates
that competing carriers must pay for access to
incumbent LECs' networks. Since we do not
know what the state-determined rates will be,
the petitioners' argument that competing
carriers will incur only minimal costs in gaining
access to incumbent LECs' networks and have
no incentive to build their own is merely
speculative at best.
III. Conclusion
We decline the petitioners' request to vacate
the FCC's entire First Report and Order and
limit our rejection of FCC rules only to those
that we have specifically overturned in this
opinion. We believe that the provisions of the
Commission's First Report and Order are
severable and that the Commission intended
them to be so.
As an aside, and while we do not pretend to
possess the Rosetta stone that reveals the true
meaning of every portion of this Act, we hope
that our review of the FCC's First Report and
Order in light of the Act's provisions offers
some guidance to the participants in the
telecommunications industry as they continue
its evolution into the competitive marketplace
Congress intended.





What does it take to form a class action suit? The Supreme Court will have to decide how to apply
its Amchem requirements of adequacy of representation, commonality, and equal shares for all class
members to the high-stakes asbestos exposure case at hand.
The United States District Court approved a Rule 23(b)(1), $1.535 billion class-action settlement of
the claims of various individuals exposed to asbestos and Fibreboard Corp. and its insurers. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded for reconsideration in
light its decision in of Amchen Products, Inc. v. Windsor (1997).
Amchen requires that settlement-only class actions satisfy the requirements that separate actions of
class members would create a risk of estopping other class members claims or impair their ability to
protect their interests, all class members share common interests, and that there is no difference in award
according to the nature of the injury.
In a brief per curiam opinion, the Fifth Circuit again affirmed the district court's approval of the
settlement. The Fifth Circuit distinguished Ortiz from Amchem, because Amchem was decided under
a different Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for class settlements and because in Amchem there was a
difference among the individual awards.
Judge Jerry E. Smith wrote a lengthy dissent in which he claimed the majority flouted the binding
Amchem precedent and "over[rode] the substantive and procedural rights of large groups of asbestos
claimants." Approval of the settlement means that those individual claimants who had previously secured
lawyers to sue Fibreboard are precluded from pursuing those claims individually.
The petitioners object to the settlement and raise several issues on appeal. They claim that the Rules
Enabling Act, which gives legitimacy to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (under which the class is
authorized) "shall not abridge . .. or modify any substantive right." The petitioners claim that the fund
artificially limits the claimants to a pro rata share of a limited fund. The petitioners also claim that class
members should be able to opt out of the class. Furthermore, they claim that there is no real justicible
controversy to adjudicate because Fibreboard picked attorneys to sue itself to create a binding settlement
and to limit Fibreboard's future liability.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and must now decide if the limited fund settlement, in reality
a friendly suit contrived by the company to get Federal jurisdiction and limit liability, is valid. The
Supreme Court must also decide issues of potential claimant notice and the inability to opt out of the
class. Furthermore, Ortiz v. Fibreboard is significant because it affects future big-money class action
suits, not only in the area of asbestos litigation, but also potentially affecting tobacco litigation and other
industries.
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WASHINGTON-The Supreme Court's rejection of a $1.3 billion class-action settlement of asbestos
claims will likely chill future efforts to settle mass tort claims with agreements that bind future claimants.
The result of the Supreme Court's 6-2 decision last week in Amchem Products Inc. et al. vs. Windsor
et al. will mean more personal injury cases jamming already overcrowded courts, say some observers.
That will bring extra pressure on Congress to step in to clarify how such "future-looking" settlements
can be structured to meet the needs of claimants as well as defendants.
But, says the attorney who argued against the asbestos settlement before the Supreme Court earlier
this year, the decision should not hamper Congress' ability to deal with something like the proposed
$368.5 billion settlement of liability claims between 40 states and the tobacco industry.
The Amchem case turned on the question of whether Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which governs civil cases, allowed the certification of a class for purposes of a global settlement of future
asbestos-related claims.
As Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg wrote for the majority, "the class proposed for certification potentially
encompasses hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of individuals tied together by this commonality:
Each was, or some day may be, adversely affected by past exposure to asbestos products manufactured
by one or more of 20 companies."
The 20 former asbestos manufacturers had formed the Asbestos Claims Facility, which was the
forerunner of the Princeton, N.J.-based Center for Claims Resolution, to handle claims made against
them by people exposed to asbestos. The consortium offered to compensate future victims according
to the diseases they manifested (BI, Jan. 25, 1993). The agreement also allowed compensation for some
claims that did not fall into the four categories of compensable diseases. Everyone who had been exposed
to asbestos but who had not filed a claim against any CCR member could either opt out of the class
formed for the settlement purpose or remain in the class and agree to use the settlement to resolve any
future claim.
A federal district court judge approved the settlement in 1994, but a three-judge panel of the 3rd U.S.
Circuit Court of Appeals in Philadelphia overturned it in 1996 (BI, May 20, 1996). The appeals court
held that the $1.3 billion settlement violated Rule 23 because disparity among the claimants' illnesses was
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greater than their commonality. The judges also said classes formed for settlement purposes had to meet
the same standard as classes formed for litigation.
The CCR members appealed to the Supreme Court, but a 6-2 majority agreed with the lower court.
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg said that what she described as the "sprawling class" did not
meet the requirements of Rule 23. The named parties in the class "with diverse medical conditions sought
to act on behalf of a single giant class rather than on behalf of discrete subclasses. In significant respects,
the interests of those within the single class are not aligned. Most saliently, for the currently injured, the
critical goal is general immediate payments. That goal tugs against the interest of exposure-only plaintiffs
in ensuring an ample, inflation-protected fund for the future," she wrote.
The justice also wrote that "many persons in the exposure-only category, the Appeals Court stressed,
may not even know of their exposure, or realize the extent of the harm they may incur. Even if they fully
appreciate the significance of class notice, those without current afflictions may not have the information
or foresight needed to decide, intelligently, whether to stay in or opt out."
The majority did note, however, that "the argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative
claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair and efficient means of compensating
victims of asbestos exposure. Congress, however, has not adopted such a solution." Rule 23 "cannot
carry the large load CCR, class counsel and the District Court heaped upon it," the opinion said.
In a partial dissent in which he was joined by Justice John Paul Stevens, Justice Stephen Breyer wrote
that, "I believe that the need for settlement in this mass tort case, with hundreds of thousands of lawsuits,
is greater than the court's opinion suggests."
After detailing his concerns about the case, Justice Breyer wrote: "The issues in this case are
complicated and difficult. The District Court might have been correct. Or not. Subclasses might be
appropriate. Or not. I cannot tell. And I do not believe this court should be in the business of trying to
make these fact-based determinations."
Justice Sandra Day O'Connor did not participate in the case.
Lawrence Fitzpatrick, president and chief executive officer of the CCR, said the immediate impact on
the facility would be slight.
"With one possible exception, I don't expect any change in the membership. The exception is the trust
created as a result of the National Gypsum bankruptcy, and that trust is currently weighing its options,
and may or may not continue as a center member. I personally feel that they probably will," he said.
"We are in discussions to try to restructure the settlement," he added.
But the impact on similar attempts to create forward-looking settlements will be considerable, said Mr.
Fitzpatrick.
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"Obviously what the court did in our case was to set up some fairly stringent road maps that
settlements must follow in order to obtain judicial approval, and I think it's going to be difficult in some
instances to structure settlements that meet all of the court's criteria."
Said Steve Bokat, executive vp of the National Chamber Litigation Center in Washington: "It's
unfortunate. I think it may leave room for some settlements in some of these cases, but it clearly will
make it harder to settle. I think it's unfortunate for the companies settling, the plaintiffs, and I think it's
unfortunate for the courts, because I think these cases are going to continue to clog the courts." The
center had filed a brief supporting CCR's position with the Supreme Court.
On the other side of the debate, a self-described public interest law group called the decision a "huge
victory for millions of asbestos victims and all Americans.
"It creates important safeguards against class-action abuse, establishes critical limits on the use of class
actions to settle personal injury claims, and raises serious doubt as to whether class actions can ever be
used to eliminate future victims' rights. This court's ruling truly enhances our system ofjustice," said the
Washington-based Trial Lawyers for Public Justice in a statement issued shortly after the decision.
But Laurence Tribe, the Harvard Law School professor who had argued against the CCR before the
Supreme Court, said the decision won't hamper another high-profile proposed mass-tort settlement, that
between state attorneys general and the tobacco industry (BI, June 23).
"Nothing in this decision casts a shadow over the authority of Congress to approve something like the
tobacco settlement," said Mr. Tribe.
"The asbestos decision underscores how indispensable the role of Congress is, because in the absence
of the asbestos ruling, it might have been possible, at least in theory, for the people who negotiated the
tobacco settlement to obtain the blessing of one or more courts around the country in order to impose
that settlement on the nation without bothering to have the matter debated and perhaps changed in
Congress."
Mr. Fitzpatrick and Mr. Bokat agreed that Congress should examine how such mass-tort settlements
can be carried out.
"I think there was an understandable backlash in the judiciary to what I call sham class-action
settlements," said Mr. Fitzpatrick. He described sham settlements as those class-action suits where
individual members of the class receive very little compensation while the attorneys walk away with
millions of dollars in fees.
"I think it's time for Congress to step in and do something that eliminates the bogus class-action
settlements but still makes it possible to use the class-action settlement mechanism as a tool to solve
serious and vexing social problems that cannot really be solved any other way," he said.
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Mr. Bokat agreed.
"I think the chamber would support some kind of congressional action" that would protect such future-
looking settlements, he said.
"If they want to have a specific rule about asbestos, that should be tailored by Congress," said Victor
E. Schwartz, counsel to the Arlington, Va.-based Product Liability Coordinating Committee. "For
legislation for asbestos to pass in this Congress, you would probably have to have the trial lawyers, the
principal defendants and the unions to agree," he said.
After its Amchem ruling, the court declined to review a proposed mass-tort settlement between
Fibreboard Corp. and thousands of people who could file asbestos-related injury claims against the
company.
Late Friday, the high court ordered the case-Flanagan vs. Ahearn-back to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals for review in light of the Amchem decision, even though the two settlements raised different
legal questions. A second asbestos-related case, Ortiz vs. Fibreboard, was also remanded to a lower
court for further review.
Aichem Products Inc. et al. vs. Windsor et al., U.S. Supreme Court. No. 96-270. June 25, 1997.
Copyright 1997 Crain Communications Inc.
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The Supreme Court has agreed to take another look at a huge class-action settlement involving
asbestos. The case out of federal court in Tyler, Texas, is designed to determine whether the Fibreboard
Corp., its insurers and others entered into a sweetheart "global settlement" with lawyers hand-picked by
the firm to limit liability in tens of thousands of asbestos-exposure cases, or whether, as Fibreboard says,
a lower court was correct in approving the settlement despite Supreme Court precedent. Fibreboard is
owned by Owens Corning. The "global settlement" meant those who wanted to sue Fibreboard
separately for asbestos would not have that opportunity, even if they thought the settlement was unfair.
In 1997, however, the Supreme Court ruled in a separate landmark asbestos case, Amchem vs. Windsor,
in favor of plaintiffs who wanted to "opt out" of a global settlement. In Amchem, 20 companies wanted
to settle present and future lawsuits over asbestos exposure at the same time, The plaintiffs claimed that
the attorneys were picked by the companies to begin a class action lawsuit that would lead to a binding
settlement, despite the objections of many plaintiffs whom the attorneys were supposed to represent. The
attorneys would have received $70 million in fees, about a third of the settlement. At the time, the
federal courts estimated there were more than 150, 000 lawsuits involving claims of exposure to
asbestos, a flame-proof material widely used for insulation and other building needs before it was
discovered to cause lung injury.
When a federal appeals court approved the Fibreboard settlement, plaintiffs who were unhappy also
took their case to the Supreme Court. Without hearing argument, the justices threw out the appeals
court ruling and ordered a new hearing in light of the Amchem decision. But the appeals court again
approved the Fibreboard settlement, saying it was different from Amchem, by a vote of 2-1, despite the
strong dissent of one judge who said the approval flouted Supreme Court precedent and "overrides the
substantive and procedural rights of large groups of asbestos claimants." The plaintiffs then once again
took their cases to the Supreme Court, saying of the appeals court, "Some people just can't take a hint."
The Supreme Court should hear argument in the case sometime next winter or spring. (Nos. 97-1704,
Ortiz et al vs. Fibreboard et al; and pending, 97-1695, Flanaghan and Middleton vs. Ahearn et al)
Copyright 1998 by United Press International. All righs reserved
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SUP. CT. VACATES ORDER APPROVING FIBREBOARD SETTLEMENT, REMANDS
Andrews Tobacco Industry Litigation Reporter
July 11, 1997
The Supreme Court on June 27 vacated the opinion by the Fifth Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals
upholding the $1.5 billion settlement in the Fibreboard Corp. class action and then remanded the suit to
the Fifth Circuit for further consideration in light of its ruling in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.
Ortiz et al. v. Fibreboard Corp et al., No. 96-1394 (U.S., certiorari denied June 27, 1997); and Flanagan
et al. v. Ahearn et al., No. 96-1379 (U.S., certiorari denied, June 27, 1997).
The Fifth Circuit approved the settlement of the class action on July 25, 1996. The majority's lengthy
opinion concluded that the action satisfied the FRCP 23(a) requirements of commonality, typicality and
adequacy of representation. It also determined that the class was properly certified as a mandatory class
action under FRCP 23(b)(1)(B).
At the same time, the Fifth Circuit also affirmed a class action settlement in Continental Casualty Co.
v. Rudd, a related action in which Fibreboard seeks approval of a $2 billion settlement with its principal
asbestos insurers, Continental Casualty Co. and Pacific Indemnity Insurance Co.
A dissenting opinion by U.S. Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith called the settlement the "first no-opt-out,
mass-tort, settlement-only, futures-only class action ever attempted or approved," and argued that the
majority had improperly "extinguished claims over which they have no jurisdiction and deprived
thousand of asbestos victims of basic constitutional rights."
As certified by the district court and affirmed by the Fifth Circuit, the class consists of all those who
have been exposed to Fibreboard asbestos products and who had not filed suit or settled a claim against
the company before Aug. 27, 1993, the date Fibreboard came to terms with attorneys who had been
selected by the district court to represent the class.
The Fifth Circuit will now have to review its ruling in light of the Supreme Court's opinion last week
in Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, in which the high court rejected a separate class action brought
against the members of the Center for Claims Resolution. In part, it ruled that a class of "future"
asbestos claimants cannot be certified because of inherent conflicts of interest among the class members.
Some objectors to the Fibreboard settlement represented by Baron & Budd of Dallas had argued in
their petition for Supreme Court review that the Fibreboard class action contains the same constitutional,
statutory and Rule 23 class certification issues as Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.
The class settlement has also been opposed by maritime claimants represented by the Jaques Admiralty
Law Firm of Detroit, which filed a separate petition for review with the Supreme Court. Leonard Jaques
says that the Supreme Court's ruling means that "the class action is dead in the water." It also means,
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according to Jaques, "that there is dim likelihood that there will ever be permitted a class action with
respect to disposing of a mass tort problem unless Congress... accepts the responsibility of providing
legislation which rules of law and court rules do not provide at this time."
Owens Corning recently announced its intention to acquire Fibreboard Corp., and the company says
that the Supreme Court's decision will not affect its decision to proceed with the acquisition.
"Owens Corning fully considered the cases during the due diligence process and factored the possibility
of these results into our decision to commence the tender offer," said Christian L. Campbell, general
counsel for the company. "Our view regarding this acquisition remains the same; the desirability of the
transaction does not depend on the outcome of Fibreboard's global settlement in the courts," he added.
If Fibreboard's global asbestos settlement is ultimately approved by the court, Campbell continued,
Fibreboard will be protected from asbestos litigation by the settlement. If the settlement is not approved
by the courts, Fibreboard's asbestos liability will be funded by the insurance settlement between
Fibreboard and its insurers, he said.
Copyright (C) 1997 Andrews Publications
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MARITIME CLAIMANTS, ORTIZ OBJECTORS SEEK SUP. CT. REVIEW OF AHEARN
Andrews Asbestos Litigation Reporter
April 17, 1998
Maritime asbestos claimants represented by the Jaques Admiralty Law Firm of Detroit and other
asbestos claimants represented by Baron & Budd of Dallas have asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
review the Fifth Circuit's January decision reaffirming the settlement of the Fibreboard Corp. class action.
Both groups of claimants argue that the circuit court's ruling conflicts with the high court's ruling in
Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, which overturned the settlement of an asbestos class action brought
against members of the Center for Claims Resolution. Flanagan et al. v. Ahearn et al. (U.S., petition
filed April 13, 1998); Ortiz et al. v. Fibreboard Corp. et al. (U.S., petition filed April 16, 1998) see
Asbestos LR, Feb. 6, 1998, P. 3.
The Fifth Circuit has, according to the Baron & Budd petition, "issued an invitation to mass tort
defendants nationwide to resolve all their future liabilities in one stroke by filing a 'limited fund'
settlement-only damages class action in the courts of that circuit - where tort reform by judicial fiat
persists despite this Court's resounding condemnation of the practice in Amchem."
The Fibreboard class consists of all those who have been exposed to Fibreboard asbestos products and
who hadn't filed suit or settled a claim against the company before Aug. 27, 1993, the date Fibreboard
agreed to a $1.535 billion settlement with attorneys selected by the district court to represent the class.
The Fifth Circuit first approved the settlement of the class action on July 25, 1996. The majority's
lengthy opinion concluded that the action satisfied the FRCP 23(a) requirements of commonality,
typicality and adequacy of representation. It also determined that the class was properly certified as a
mandatory class action under FRCP 23(b)(1)(B).
At the same time, the Fifth Circuit also affirmed a class action settlement in Continental Casualty Co.
v. Rudd, a related action in which Fibreboard seeks approval of a $2 billion settlement with its principal
asbestos insurers, Continental Casualty Co. and Pacific Indemnity Insurance Co.
The Supreme Court on June 27, 1997 vacated the Fifth Circuit's opinion and remanded it to the appeals
court for further consideration in light of its opinion in Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, in which the
high court rejected a separate class action brought against the members of the Center for Claims
Resolution. In part, it ruled in Amchem that a class of "future" claimants cannot be certified because of
inherent conflicts among the class members.
The Fifth Circuit subsequently ordered more briefing by the parties on what action it should take in light
of Amchem. The principal parties to the litigation - Fibreboard, its insurers and the future claimants -
all urged the court to affirm its prior ruling. Asbestos claimants represented by Baron & Budd and
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maritime asbestos claimants represented by the Jaques Admiralty Law Firm of Detroit argued that
Amchem required the Fifth Circuit to reverse its prior ruling.
A divided, three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit once again approved the settlements on Jan. 27. A
two-judge majority of the Fifth Circuit panel said that it found nothing in Amchem Products that changes
its prior decision.
The majority pointed to two "controlling differences" between the case before it and Amchem. First,
it said, Amchem proposed certification of a class pursuant to FRCP 23(b)(3), while the instant class was
certified under Rule 23(b)(1). Second, the majority said that there is no allocation or difference in
awards for individual class members based on the nature or severity of their injuries as there was in
Amchem. "In the case here all members of the future claimant class are treated alike," it said.
Finally, the majority said that the members of the instant class are not plagued by conflicting interests
like those present in Amchem.
Circuit Judge Jerry E. Smith dissented forcefully. He said that the majority's ruling is "fatally flawed"
by its treatment of Fibreboard and its insurers as a limited fund, thereby allowing certification under Rule
23(b)(1)(B). The case isn't suitable for treatment as a limited fund under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), he said,
because the asbestos claimants have causes of action against Fibreboard itself for damages not limited
by its available insurance coverage, not against a fund.
The judge also accuses the majority of permitting Fibreboard to evade bankruptcy without giving its
creditors any indication of what they would be afforded under the Bankruptcy Code. "It is, moreover,
a colossal bailout for Fibreboard's shareholders that would not occur in bankruptcy," he added.
Judge Smith also maintained that the class must fail under Amchem because of inadequately
representative named plaintiffs and for lack of common issues among the class members.
The Ortiz Objectors' Petition
In their petition for Supreme Court review, the claimants represented by Baron & Budd (the Ortiz
objectors) argue that the Fifth Circuit "defied" Amchem's holding that a settlement class action requires
heightened attention to the requirements of FRCP 23(a) because the Fifth Circuit said those requirements
weren't important in the context of a settlement class action. The Fifth Circuit's rulings on Rule 23(a)'s
requirements are "irretrievably tainted" by its application of an erroneous legal standard, the objectors
maintain.
The objectors next argue that the Rules Enabling Act prohibits mandatory class treatment of individual
claims for damages alleged in the case. The Act says that Rules of Procedure "shall not abridge, enlarge
or modify any substantive right." Here, the objectors says, the court is allowing the settling parties to
use FRCP 23 to artificially limit the claimants to a pro rata share of an artificially limited settlement fund.
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They next insist that due process requires that class members who seek damages for personal injuries
must be given an opportunity to opt out of the class. The district court and the Fifth Circuit erred, they
say, in relying on the settlement to "recast" the plaintiffs' claims for damages as equitable claims for relief
that qualify for mandatory class treatment. They note that the Fifth Circuit majority conceded that the
plaintiffs' central legal theory in their complaint is that Fibreboard is liable in tort for damages.
Review is also needed, the objectors continue, to address the issue of whether adequate notice can be
given to a class of future claimants, an issue they say the Amchem court recognized but didn't resolve.
Finally, the objectors argue that the class action isn't a justiciable controversy under Article III of the
Constitution. They call the suit a "feigned proceeding" intended to resolve future - not existing claims
for injuries.
"The filing of the complaint was orchestrated by the settling parties solely as part of their joint effort
to foist their negotiated tort reform proposal upon the class. Article III jurisdiction may not rest upon
such a 'contrivance between friends for the purpose of founding a jurisdiction which otherwise would
not exist,"' the objectors insist.
The objectors brief was submitted by Frederick M. Baron, Brent M. Rosenthal and Stee Baughman
with Baron & Budd and by Laurence H. Tribe and Brian Koudoutchos of Cambridge, MA.
The Maritime Claimants' Petition
The maritime claimants contend that the Fibreboard class is doomed by the absence of true common
issues. The only issue common to the class is their common interest in avoiding the possibility that
Fibreboard will be left without insurance coverage for their claims, the maritime claimants say. "Fears
about the outcome of the Coverage Case - litigation to which the class members were strangers - do not
fill the bill for 'legal or factual questions that qualify each class member's case as a genuine controversy.'
Those questions concern the class member's asbestos-related claim against Fibreboard - not inchoate
fears about whether a judgment against Fibreboard could be enforced," the objectors insist.
This absence of common issues "dooms Ahearn for the same reason the Amchem settlement could not
stand," they say.
In addition, the maritime claimants also argue that the same intra-class conflicts that consigned the
Amchem global settlement to oblivion are fatal to the Ahearn settlement. There is no principled way to
distinguish the Fibreboard class from the Amchem, they say. "Indeed", they continue, "the conflict is
more egregious in the instant 'limited fund' case. The CCR settlement fund was subject to future
replenishment, at least in theory. The Global Settlement is not. The 'tug' between interests pulls with
even greater urgency. In the absence of proper subclassing, the Global Settlement must fail for this
reason alone," they argue.
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In other parts of their brief, the maritime claimants charge that the Fifth Circuit majority has engaged
in "impermissible, judicially legislated tort," and that the majority's "ultra-brief per curiam opinion does
not discharge its duty to engage in reasoned recitation on remand."
The maritime claimants' brief was submitted by Leonard Jaques with the Jaques Admiralty Law Firm
of Detroit.
Copyright (C) 1998 Andrews Publications
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97-1704 ORTIZ v. FIBREBOARD CORP.
Ruling below (Flanagan v. Ahearn, CA 5, 134 F.3d 668, 66 LW 1495):
Class settlement in asbestos litigation is unaffected by Amchem Products Inc. v. Windsor, 65 LW 4635
(US SupCt 1997), which struck down another asbestos class settlement, because, unlike Amchem, in
which common issues did not predominate over individual ones and named parties did not fairly
represent class, settlement in this case was certified as limited fund under Fed.R. Civ.P 23(b)(1)(B),
which does not require predominance showing required under Rule 23(b)(3), which governed in
Amchem, and, unlike settlement in Amchem, settlement in this case contemplated no allocation or
difference in award according to nature or severity of injury.
Questions presented: (1) May Rule 23(a) requirements of commonality and typicality be met in Rule
23(b)(1)(B) class action, despite Amchem Products v. Windsor, by reference to proposed settlement
when claims alleged in complaint share no common or typical questions of law or fact, and may such
class be certified under Rule 23(a)(4) despite existence of structural conflicts of interest--including
conflict between presently injured and future claimants, same conflict condemned by this court in
Amchem? (2) Despite Rules Enabling Act, Rules of Decision Act, teachings of Amchem, and principles
of federalism, may federal court certify class action under Rule 23(b)(1)(B), premised upon 'limited fund'
contrived by settlement between parties, to circumvent Bankruptcy Code and to alter substantive state
law rights of absent class members? (3) Does Due Process Clause: (a) permit federal court to bind absent
class members (including residents of state where action is brought) to class action judgment that alters
their in personam claims for money damages without giving them chance to opt out of class, and (b)
permit federal court sitting in diversity to exercise personal jurisdiction over class members asserting in
personam claims for damages without giving them chance to opt out, when those class members lack
minimum contacts with forum state? (4) Can class notice sufficient under Due Process Clause and Rule
23(e) ever be given to class that includes unknowing, unidentifiable, potential future asbestos victims
who have no perceptible injury at time of class settlement and notice? (5) Does federal court have power
under Article III to adjudicate 'case' brought by plaintiffs who do not in good faith plead claims they
intend to litigate, but who bring suit as friendly joint venture with defendants solely to provide
jurisdictional hook on which federal court agrees to hang tort reform proposal displacing laws of 50
states?
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In our prior opinion, we affirmed the judgment
below, which approved class action settlements
of asbestos-related claims involving Fibreboard
Corporation. In re Asbestos Litigation, 90 F.3d
963 (5th Cir.1996), vacated, 117 S.Ct. 2503,
(1997). The Supreme Court vacated our
judgment and remanded the case for
reconsideration in light of Amchem Products,
Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S.Ct. 2231 (1997). After
oral argument and reconsideration, we can find
nothing in the Amchem opinion that changes our
prior decision. We again affirm.
There are two controlling differences between
this case and Amchem. First, this class action
proceeded under Rule 23(b)(1); Amchem was
a Rule 23(b)(3) case. Second, there was no
allocation or difference in award, according to
nature or severity of injury, in the present case
as there was in Amchem; in the case here all
members of the future claimant class are treated
alike. Individual damage awards will
subsequently be decided according to individual
damages.
The district court made extensive findings and
found, specifically, that separate actions by
members of the class would create a risk of
adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would as a practical
matter be dispositive of the interests of the other
members not parties to the adjudications or
substantially impair or impede their ability to
protect their interests. The language of the
district court matches the language of Rule
23(b)(1)(B). No one has contested that finding
of the district court, probably because it is
incontestable.
The Supreme Court stated in Amchem that a
settlement class action, like all federal class
actions, cannot proceed unless the requirements
of Rule 23(a) are met, irrespective of whether
the proposed settlement is deemed fair under
Rule 23(e). We detailed in our prior opinion
our agreement with the thorough study and
conclusions by the district court, satisfying the
requirements of class certification under Rule
23(a). All members of the class, and all class
representatives, share the common interests:
suffering harm from asbestos exposure and
seeking equitable distribution of compensation
from limited funds. None of the uncommon
questions, abounding in Amchem, exist in the
present case.
The only conflict between members of the
future claimant class could be competition for
larger and earlier shares of available money, but
that is precisely the reason for Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
and the problem it is designed to solve where
the money is limited. That conflict or
competition is controlled for the benefit of all
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members of the class. It follows that the lawyer
representing the class serves only common
interests of the class.
The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
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KUMHO TIRE CO. v. CARMICHAEL
By Darren Welch
When products liability plaintiffs bring suit against manufacturers, the standard method to make one's
case is by offering expert testimony that the defendant is at fault for design or manufacturing defects in
the product. This term, the Supreme Court will decide what standard of reliability a witness must pass
before testifying as an expert based on general observation.
On July 6, 1993, plaintiff-appellant Carmichaels' minivan crashed. Defendant-appellees concede the
accident was the result of a tire failure. The Carmichaels sued Kumho Tire in federal district court and
offered the testimony of Dennis Carlson, an expert on tire failure with 20 years of experience in the field.
A Federal District Court judge in Alabama excluded Carlson's testimony ruling that it did not meet
the Daubert criteria for reliability. Writing for the majority in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
(1993), Justice Blackmun outlined some factors for the admissibility of scientific evidence. These factors
include 1) Whether the methodology has a known error rate; 2) Whether the methodology is testable,
3) Whether there are standards for applying the methodology; and 4) Whether the methodology is
generally accepted in the scientific community. Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence 702 which states
"If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
The Carmichael's appealed the exclusion of Carlson's testimony. They argued that the Daubert
criteria should not apply to expert opinions based on general experience. Both parties agree that Carlson
is an expert on tire failure from having analyzed thousands of failed tires. The Carmichaels argue that
Carlson's testimony satisfies rule 702 and that Daubert does not apply.
The Eleventh Circuit remanded for reconsideration. Writing for the majority, Judge Birch ruled that
Carlson's testimony was "non-scientific," but rather based on general observations and thus the Daubert
criteria does not apply.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide if trial judges can consider the four Daubert factors
in the Rule 702 analysis of the admissibility of the engineering expert testimony.
Carmichael v. Samyang is important because it will decide what type of expert testimony plaintiffs
can offer in big-money product liability cases. Plaintiffs in these cases are often modest-income
consumers who cannot afford industry experts, who are often already retained by defendant
manufacturers. Sometimes, cash-strapped plaintiffs must secure general observation experts other than
those in the industry themselves.
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The Supreme Court must now decide between the court system's interest in keeping "junk science"
out of the courtroom and the plaintiffs interest in securing witnesses who have expertise based on
general observation.
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EXPERT WITNESSES UNDER COURT SCRUTINY
Rubber & Plastics News
July 06, 1998
Miles Moore Rubber & Plastics News Staff
WASHINGTON--The Supreme Court has agreed to determine if non-scientific expert witnesses in
product liability cases should be held to the same standards as scientific experts.
In a move that could have a major impact on all such lawsuits, the court agreed June 22 to settle this
issue by granting Kumho Tire U.S.A. Inc.'s petition for review of a tire product liability case.
In July 1993, eight members of the Carmichael family were riding in their minivan when a Kumho tire
on the vehicle blew out. A resulting accident killed one child and injured the other family members.
The Carmichaels sued in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Alabama, claiming the failed
tire was defective. In a summary judgment, the court ruled in Kumho's favor, but an appeals court sided
with the Carmichaels.
During the case, the Carmichaels' attorneys called Dennis Carlson, a former engineer with Michelin
North America Inc., as an expert witness.
In its appeal to the high court, Kumho said appeals courts have been split sharply on the question of
whether the stringent scientific standards for expert witnesses set by an earlier Supreme Court case,
Daubert vs. Merrill Dow Pharmaceuticals, also apply to engineering experts.
Kumho's attorneys argued that they do.
"Application of Daubert to expert engineers would drive the quality of such expert evidence in the right
direction by ensuring the reliability of their analyses and methods before admitting their testimony,"
Kumho said in its brief "If there is an easier admissibility standard for less qualified experts, then lawyers
are invited to use less qualified experts in order to avoid analysis of these experts' proposed testimony."
In a four-page response to Kumho's appeal, the Carmichaels' attorneys said Kumho "begs the question
of whether or not the testimony is scientific or technical in nature." If it is technical--and the appeals
court correctly held it is, according to the Carmichaels--then Daubert cannot apply, they said.
The Carmichaels also accused Kumho of misrepresenting Carlson's testimony. Kumho claimed Carlson
had never seen the blown-out tire before issuing his theory that it was defective. Instead, the Carmichaels
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said, "the evidence in this case reveals that Mr. Carlson reviewed several photographs of the subject tire."
Carlson also reviewed an earlier study by an expert witness who became ill and could not continue with
the case and inspected the blown tire prior to giving his deposition, they said.
In his testimony at the first trial, Carlson theorized a design or manufacturing defect caused the
blowout, but he did not pinpoint a specific problem. Instead, he said, there was no evidence the tire was
abused, and he concluded it was defective.
Kumho petitioned the court for summary judgment and exclusion of Carlson's testimony. The tire
maker held that Carlson's theories didn't hold up under the stringent scientific standards for expert
witnesses set by Daubert.
The court granted both motions. "Carlson's testimony is simply too unreliable, too speculative and too
attenuated to the scientific knowledge on which it is based to be of material assistance to the trier of
fact," it ruled.
The Carmichaels appealed to the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, arguing the application of Daubert's
stringent standards to Carlson's testimony is inappropriate and outside the scope of that decision.
In ruling for the Carmichaels, the appeals court said it is apparent Carlson's testimony is non-scientific
and, therefore, not covered by Daubert. "Carlson makes no pretense of basing his opinion on any
scientific theory of physics or chemistry," the court said. "Instead, Carlson rests his opinion on his
experience in analyzing failed tires."
Sidney W. Jackson III, lead attorney for the Carmichaels, said he is "not surprised" the high court
granted Kumho's appeal.
Kumbo's attorneys and Carlson could not be reached for comment. Other expert witnesses who often
testify in tire cases either couldn't be reached or declined to comment.
The Supreme Court has not yet said when oral arguments in the case will be heard.
Copyright 1998 Crain Communications, Inc.
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SUPREME COURT TO REVIEW USE OF SCIENTIFIC EXPERTS
The New Orleans Times-Picayune
June 23, 1998
The U.S. Supreme Court will consider giving companies a powerful new weapon to fend off expert
testimony that can be decisive in product-liability cases.
The court agreed to hear an appeal by Korean tire maker Kumho Tire Co. in a case that will give the
nine justices a chance to extend a major 1993 decision requiring judges to strictly screen
evidence based on scientific studies.
The court will consider arguments that judges must use the same demanding standard in deciding
whether experts can offer conclusions based on their general experience or training, rather than a specific
scientific study.
With 40,000 product-liability cases filed every year in federal courts, the issue has broad practical
consequences. People pressing those cases often rely on expert witnesses, such as engineers, to bolster
claims about a product defect.
"It's probably the biggest business case of the term next year," said Alan Untereiner, a Washington
product-liability lawyer. "These cases often come down to competing experts testifying."
The case could have a particularly large impact on makers of products such as automobiles and medical
devices - frequent targets of expensive product-liability suits.
Kumho Tire is fighting a lawsuit by an Alabama family whose minivan crashed in 1993, killing a child
and injuring the seven others in the van. The family, Patrick and Luzviminda Carmichael and their
children, charged that the blowout of a five-year-old Kumho tire caused the crash.
The court will hear arguments during its 1998-99 term, with a decision expected by July 1999.
The key question for the justices is how to apply their 1993 decision, Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., which told federal trial judges to keep "junk science" out of the courtroom. In a
fight about birth defects allegedly caused by a prescription drug, the high court said judges must make
sure evidence from scientific tests is based on widely accepted scientific methods, not unproven or
controversial experiments.
That decision has prompted confusion and debate in lower courts. Some say the Supreme Court meant
to impose strict standards that prevent the introduction of any expert testimony not based on rigid
scientific tests.
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Other courts, such as the panel in the Kumho case, say the Daubert ruling was more limited. Those
judges say the decision applies only to evidence that's actually based on formal scientific theories or
testing and doesn't prevent experts from relying on their general experience to provide testimony about
technical matters.
In the Kumho case, the Carmichaels attempted to present the testimony of Dennis Carlson, a
mechanical engineer who, based on his experience in the field, concluded the tire was defective.
A federal trial judge in Alabama, relying on the Daubert ruling, said Carlson's testimony wasn't reliable
enough to warrant allowing a jury to consider it. Having rejected the engineer's testimony, the judge then
threw out the case, saying the Carmichaels didn't have enough evidence to support their claims.
The Atlanta-based 11th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that ruling in a 3-0 decision in
December, reviving the lawsuit and permitting Carlson's testimony.
Kumho argues the lower court ruling creates a loophole that would allow unreliable testimony as long
as the expert doesn't point to a particular method or technique as the basis for his or her conclusions.
The company also argues that, because engineers rely on the application of scientific principles, they
aren't fundamentally different from scientists.
The New Orleans Times-Picayune Copyright 1998
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Litigants on both sides of a products claim rely on forensic experts when preparing and presenting
evidence. In connection with products as diverse as aircraft, motor vehicles, breast implants, asbestos,
farm equipment, and tobacco, experts are called on to help juries understand the specific product's
design, defective features, alternative designs, and the causal relationship between the design marketed
and the injury.
Typically, a plaintiff has the disadvantage of not being able to hire experts currently employed in the
related industry and must instead locate experts who have, either through education or former work
experience, delved into the related fields of product safety and design or injury analysis.
Ordinarily, because most plaintiffs have limited financial backing, these experts are unable to conduct
expensive, time-consuming scientific research. Instead, their analysis is usually based on the facts of the
case, a physical study of the product, its performance in the specific case and as reported in the literature,
the available design alternatives used by others in the industry, and a deductive analysis of injury
causation.
The defense experts--usually employed within the related industry--rely on industry studies supported
by publications often financed and controlled by the industry. The contrast in technical support for each
adversary's position is directly related to the parties' respective financial strengths. The Third Circuit
Court of Appeals framed the problem astutely several years ago.
If we were to declare as a rule of law that one must actually have practical experience in a given
industry in order to qualify as an expert in litigation involving its products, we might very well place an
onerous burden on plaintiffs in some cases. Where the industry is small and tightly knit, it may be very
difficult for the plaintiff to obtain the services of an expert currently employed therein, and it might be
equally difficult to find someone who was formerly employed in the industry. But the key experts of an
industry would normally be available to the defendants.
Nevertheless, experts on both sides are generally competent to call on their education, work experience,
public literature and research, and product comparisons to present their diverse opinions to the jury. And
while the system is often "stacked" in favor of the wealthy defendants, plaintiffs at least have the
opportunity to present their grievances to juries of their peers.
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In recent years, the defense bar has mounted a legal offensive, euphemistically called "the Daubert
defence," to skew the balance of "expert power." In case after case--more often in federal court than in
state court--the defense challenges plaintiffs' experts on the bases that they have no personal experience
designing the product and that their opinions lack sufficient scientific foundation because they are not
supported by the industry-cultivated scientific community. The defense is based on a strained application
of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. As odd as it may
seem, the defense bar and some courts have interpreted what was intended by the Court as a loosening
of restrictions on expert testimony as a protocol for narrowing the field of experts who are competent
to testify. A brief analysis of Daubert and its progeny will demonstrate the fallacy that Daubert has
licensed courts to reduce litigation by excluding competent experts.
The Supreme Court abandoned the rigid "general acceptance" test used by most courts to judge the
propriety of expert opinions on "novel" or "unorthodox techniques" and decided that this testimony must
be evaluated by the liberal construction intended by Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
Daubert recognized that trial courts serve a "gatekeeper" function by judging --before a jury hears the
testimony--whether proposed scientific evidence predicated on novel or unorthodox techniques is
sufficiently trustworthy to assist the jury in deciding the issues at hand. The Court said a trial court must
make a twofold inquiry under Rule 702--whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact and whether
it amounts to "scientific knowledge."
In determining what constitutes scientific knowledge, the Court said the focus must be on the principles
and methodologies used, not on the conclusions themselves.
The origin of the controversy addressed in Daubert was the so-called junk science debate fueled by
legal. commentators and a court system unsure of how to handle the complicated and sometimes
controversial scientific study of injury causation using animal testing.
The plaintiffs claimed two mothers' ingestion of Bendectin had caused severe birth defects in their
children. The conclusions of plaintiffs' experts linking the drug to birth defects was derived from
evidence in the form of in vitro research, animal studies, and re-analysis of published epidemiological
studies.
The Supreme Court, faced with the reality of disparate means available to civil litigants because of
unequal financial wealth and disproportionate opportunity to scientifically validate opinions, held general
acceptance was no longer a pre-requisite to admissibility. Instead, the Court provided a "menu" of
factors a trial judge should consider before deciding the issue. These factors included
* whether the expert's proposition is testable, has been tested, and has been subjected to peer review
and publication;
* whether the methodology or technique has a known error rate;
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* whether there are standards for applying the methodology, and
* whether the methodology is generally accepted in the scientific community.
Unfortunately, some courts misconstrued the Court's intent in introducing the liberalized standard of
Rule 702 and wrongly assumed the Court was creating new restrictions on the admissibility of traditional
expert opinions.
The Test Under Rule 702
Courts are accorded broad discretion in determining the competency of proposed expert witnesses
under the rule. It provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
Courts have consistently recognized that the rule reflects an attempt to liberalize the rules governing
the admission of expert testimony. For example, the Fifth Circuit has reasoned that the use of the
conjunction "or" suggests an expert may be qualified on any of the five bases listed.
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has observed:
The Advisory Notes to the Rule comment that "[t]he rule is broadly phrased. The fields of knowledge
which may be drawn upon are not limited merely to the 'scientific' and 'technical' but extend to all
'specialized' knowledge. Similarly, the expert is viewed, not in a narrow sense, but as a person qualified
by 'knowledge, skill, experience, training or education. '
Under Rule 702, an individual need possess no special academic credentials to serve as an expert, and
courts have routinely held that individuals can qualify as experts where they possess sufficient knowledge
gained from practical experience, even if they lack academic qualifications in the particular field of
expertise. For example, a New York federal district court has held that an expert who has the
background to permit him or her to analyze a given set of circumstances can become an expert on a
particular product through reading, calculations, and reasoning from known scientific principles.
Daubert Misapplied
The Daubert decision sought to clarify the standard for evaluating scientific knowledge for purposes
of admissibility. The question of admissibility, however, arises only where the proffered evidence deals
with "scientific knowledge." The decision does not apply where an expert's opinion is based on education
and experience rather than scientific testing.
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Despite this, countless defendants have moved to exclude expert testimony in traditional products cases
on the basis that expert opinions regarding product defect and causation do not conform to the Daubert
criteria. Although some courts have recognized the fallacy of this argument, other courts have mistakenly
accepted it as a correct interpretation of the law.
One of the most glaring misapplications of Daubert occurred in Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc.
There, the trial court entered summary judgment for the defendant tire manufacturers after concluding
that the plaintiffs forensic tire expert--who was admittedly well qualified in his field--had not provided
sufficient "scientific foundation" for his opinions, compelling the exclusion of those opinions.
The case involved a rollover accident precipitated by a tire blowout--allegedly caused by tire tread
separation. The plaintiffs expert testified in deposition that he had inspected the tire in question and that,
consistent with his experience studying other tire separations over the years, he had concluded the
blowout was due to a defect in the adhesion among the rubber, steel, and nylon components. He
observed that his opinion was based on deductive reasoning--after examining the tire, he had failed to
find any evidence of other possible causes.
Despite the logic of this analysis, the trial court used its "gatekeeper" function to disqualify the expert,
finding (1) his method of analysis was not susceptible to testing, (2) there were no publications
addressing the method, (3) there was no evidence of its potential error rate, and (4) there was no
evidence that the method was accepted in the scientific community.
Unfortunately, the trial court in Carmichael and a minority of other courts have improperly construed
Daubert as a license to exclude any expert testimony grounded on empirical analysis alone. Taken to its
furthest reach, this exclusionary approach can eliminate any opinion that does not meet the many factors
listed in Daubert. Fortunately, several appellate courts have ruled otherwise.
Quite often in science, an opinion will not be subject to actual testing. This is particularly true when
the resulting product failure cannot be duplicated. Trial judges must differentiate between the Daubert
screening of expert opinion based on "scientific knowledge" or "methodology" and the court's role when
an opinion is based on the more typical range of factors, including the expert's education, experience,
and factual study.
The logic of Daubert is that experts should be permitted to testify based on well-reasoned science. That
science does not have to be supported by physical testing, nor does it require that the opposing experts
agree with it. What is necessary is that litigants make a simple showing that the proffered opinions are
based on legitimate scientific logic. Applying this approach, courts should inevitably admit into evidence
all relevant expert testimony.
Copyright 1996 Association of Trial Lawyers of America
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Ruling below (Carmichael v. Samyang Tire Inc., CA 11, 131 F.3d 1433, 66 LW 1408):
Expert testimony that implicates scientific principles but that is based on expert's experience and
observations need not be subjected to four-part analysis outlined in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 61 LW 4805 (1993), for admission of scientific evidence.
Question presented: May trial judge consider four factors set out in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals Inc. in Fed.R.Evid. 702 analysis of admissibility of engineering expert's testimony?
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In this appeal, we determine whether the
Supreme Court's Daubert criteria for admission
of scientific evidence should apply to testimony
from a tire failure expert. In granting summary
judgment against plaintiff- appellants, the
district court relied on Daubert to exclude
testimony from plaintiff-appellants' expert.
Plaintiff-appellants, however, argue that the
district court should not have applied Daubert
because their expert's proffered testimony is not
"scientific." We REVERSE.
I. BACKGROUND
On July 6, 1993, plaintiff-appellants, eight
members of the Carmichael family (collectively
"the Carmichaels"), were involved in a serious
automobile mishap when the right rear tire on
their minivan failed. This occurrence resulted in
significant trauma to each of the Carmichaels,
one member of the family ultimately died from
her injuries. For the purposes of this appeal, the
parties agree that the failure of a tire
manufactured and sold by defendant- appellees
(collectively "Samyang") directly caused the
mishap.
Following the incident, the Carmichaels
submitted the carcass of the failed tire to
George Edwards, a purported expert on tire
failure. After examining the tire, Edwards
determined that its failure was not the result of
any abuse by the Carmichaels. Therefore,
Edwards concluded that a defect in either the
tire's design or its manufacture caused the
blowout. Before Edwards could be deposed by
Samyang, however, he became too ill to testify
and transferred the case to his employee, Dennis
Carlson [FN I]. After reviewing Edwards's file
on the tire and discussing the case with
Edwards, Carlson confirmed Edwards's
conclusion that a design or manufacturing defect
caused the blowout. Carlson, though, did not
personally examine the tire until approximately
one hour before his deposition by Samyang,
long after he had rendered his opinion on the
cause of the blowout. In his deposition, Carlson
then set forth both his analytical process and his
conclusion that the Carmichaels' tire was
defective.
FN 1. Carlson holds a bachelor's and a
master's degree in mechanical
engineering from the Georgia Institute
of Technology. Carlson worked from
1977 to 1987 as a research engineer for
Michelin Americas Research &
Development, where he was involved
for the majority of his tenure in tire
testing. Following that experience,
Carlson became a senior project
engineer at S.E.A., Inc., where he
served from 1987 to 1994 as a tire
failure consultant before becoming an
employee of George R. Edwards, Inc.
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The District Court assumed for the
purpose of its Daubert analysis that
Carlson is qualified to testify as an
expert in tire failure analysis. See
Carmichael v. Samyang Tires, Inc., 923
F.Supp. 1514, 1518-19 (S.D.Ala.1996).
We, like the district court, assume that
Carlson is an expert for the purposes of
this appeal.
Before the district court, Samyang moved for
the exclusion of Carlson's testimony on the
ground that it could not satisfy Daubert 's
standards for reliability of scientific evidence.
After reviewing Carlson's deposition, the district
court agreed and excluded Carlson, writing that
"none of the four admissibility criteria outlined
by the Daubert court are satisfied in this case."
Carmichael, 923 F.Supp. at 1521. Because the
Carmichaels' only proffered evidence of a tire
defect was Carlson's testimony, the district court
then granted summary judgment for Samyang.
See id. at 1524. The Carmichaels now appeal
the exclusion of their tire expert.
II. DISCUSSION
In Daubert, the Supreme Court established
several general criteria for the admission of
scientific expert testimony under Federal Rule of
Evidence 702. [FN2] See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
593-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2796. Appealing the
district court's exclusion of Carlson's testimony,
the Carmichaels argue that the district court
should not have applied Daubert 's reliability
framework because Carlson is not a "scientific"
expert. In response, Samyang contends that
Carlson's testimony is based on an unreliable
scientific analysis. We review the district court's
legal decision to apply Daubert de novo, see
Compton v. Subaru ofAm., Inc., 82 F.3d 1513,
1517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 611
(1996), and its decision to exclude particular
evidence under Daubert for abuse of discretion,
see General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 118 S.Ct. 512
(1997).
FN2. Rule 702 provides that "If
scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine
a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an
expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise."
The Court suggested four primary inquiries for
determining the reliability of a scientific theory
or technique: (1) whether it has been tested;
(2) whether it has been subject to peer review
and publication; (3) its known or potential rate
of error; and (4) whether it is generally
accepted by the relevant scientific community.
However, the Court emphasized that
"[t]he inquiry envisioned by Rule 702 is ... a
flexible one. Its overarching subject is the
scientific validity--and thus the evidentiary
relevance and reliability--of the principles that
underlie a proposed submission." Daubert, 509
U.S. at 594-95, 113 S.Ct. at 2797.
Despite Samyang's protestations, "Daubert
does not create a special analysis for answering
questions about the admissibility of all expert
testimony. Instead, it provides a method for
evaluating the reliability of witnesses who claim
scientific expertise." United States v. Sinclair,
74 F.3d 753, 757 (7th Cir.1996). In fact, the
Supreme Court in Daubert explicitly limited its
holding to cover only the "scientific context."
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590 n. 8, 113 S.Ct. at
2795 n. 8; see also United States v. Cordoba,
104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir.1997) ("Daubert
applies only to the admission of scientific
testimony."); Compton, 82 F.3d at 1518
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(same); lacobelli Constr., Inc. v. County of
Monroe, 32 F.3d 19, 25 (2d Cir.1994) (same).
Although the Court's analysis in Daubert may
suggest reliability issues for district courts to
consider as they determine whether proffered
evidence is sufficiently reliable for admission
under Rule 702, "the trial court's role as
gatekeeper is not intended to serve as a
replacement for the adversary system:
'Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of
contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the
burden of proof are the traditional and
appropriate means of attacking shaky but
admissible evidence.' " United States v. 14.38
Acres of Land, 80 F.3d 1074, 1078 (5th
Cir.1996) (quoting Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596,
113 S.Ct. at 2798).
What, then, is the difference between scientific
and non-scientific expert testimony? In short, a
scientific expert is an expert who relies on the
application of scientific principles, rather than on
skill- or experience-based observation, for the
basis of his opinion. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at
590, 113 S.Ct. at 2795. As the Sixth Circuit
explained in Berry v. City of Detroit:
The distinction between scientific and
non-scientific expert testimony is a critical one.
By way of illustration, if one wanted to explain
to a jury how a bumblebee is able to fly, an
aeronautical engineer might be a helpful witness.
Since flight principles have some universality,
the expert could apply general principles to the
case of the bumblebee. Conceivably, even if he
had never seen a bumblebee, he still would be
qualified to testify, as long as he was familiar
with its component parts.
On the other hand, if one wanted to prove that
bumblebees always take off into the wind, a
beekeeper with no scientific training at all would
be an acceptable witness if a proper foundations
were laid for his conclusions. The foundation
would not relate to his formal training, but to his
firsthand observations. In other words, the
beekeeper does not know any more about flight
principles than the jurors, but he has seen a lot
more bumblebees than they have. 25 F.3d 1342,
1349-50 (6th Cir. 1994). Thus, the question in
this case is whether Carlson's testimony is based
on his application of scientific principles or
theories (which we should submit to a Daubert
analysis) or on his utilization of personal
experience and skill with failed tires (which we
would usually expect a district court to allow a
jury to evaluate). In other words, is the
testimony at issue in this case more like that of
a beekeeper applying his experience with bees or
that of an aeronautical engineer applying his
more generalized knowledge of the scientific
principles of flight?
Having clarified the question posed by this
case, it seems apparent to us that Carlson's
testimony is non-scientific. Although Samyang
is no doubt correct that the laws of physics and
chemistry are implicated in the failure of the
Carmichaels' tire, Carlson makes no pretense of
basing his opinion on any scientific theory of
physics or chemistry. Instead, Carlson rests his
opinion on his experience in analyzing failed
tires. After years of looking at the mangled
carcasses of blown-out tires, Carlson claims that
he can identify telltale markings revealing
whether a tire failed because of abuse or defect.
Like a beekeeper who claims to have learned
through years of observation that his charges
always take flight into the wind, Carlson
maintains that his experiences in analyzing tires
have taught him what "bead grooves" and
"sidewall deterioration" indicate as to the cause
of a tire's failure. Indeed, Carlson asserts no
knowledge of the physics or chemistry that
might explain why the Carmichaels' tire failed.
Thus, we conclude that Carlson's testimony
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falls outside the scope of Daubert and that the
district court erred as a matter of law by
applying Daubert in this case.
Still, the inapplicability of Daubert should not
end the day regarding Carlson's reliability.
Under Rule 702, it is the district court's duty to
determine if Carlson's testimony is sufficiently
reliable and relevant to assist ajury. See 14.38
Acres, 80 F.3d at 1078. Moreover, Carlson's
testimony is subject to exclusion under Federal
Rule of Evidence 403 if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by its likely prejudicial
effect. Aside from its Daubert related
arguments, Samyang has presented this court
with a number of potentially troubling criticisms
of Carlson's alleged expertise and methodology,
including his rendering of an opinion regarding
the Carmichaels' tire before he had personally
inspected its carcass. We leave judgments about
such matters to the discretion of the district
court on remand.
III. CONCLUSION
The district court erred as a matter of law in
applying the Daubert criteria to the Carmichaels'
proffered expert testimony.
Therefore, we REVERSE and REMAND the
case to the district court for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
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WRIGHT v. UNIVERSAL MARITIME SERVICE CORPORATION
By Troy R. Rackham
If a collective bargaining agreement requires affected employees to submit all of their claims against
the employer to arbitration, does this mean that employees cannot sue employers for violating statutory
rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)? Many in the legal world thought this question
had already been answered. After all, the Supreme Court held in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Company (1974) that an employee covered by a collective bargaining agreement could still sue his
employer for discriminating against him on the basis of race in violation of Title VII. The unanimous
Court reasoned that the right secured by Title VII, to be free from racial discrimination in employment,
is independent of the right to enforce the contractual provision requiring arbitration. Moreover, the
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh circuits have all held that an employee can still sue
his employer for a claim of discrimination in violation of the ADA.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, held in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service
Corporation that an employee cannot sue his employer over an alleged violation of the ADA because
he is under a collective bargaining agreement which requires him to submit all of his claims against his
employer to arbitration. The Fourth Circuit relied on its earlier decision, Austin v. Owens- Brockway
Glass Container, in which the Fourth Circuit concluded that the Supreme Court itself had significantly
limited its Alexander in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Coiporation. The Supreme Court, in Gilmer,
held that arbitration of statutory claims is binding upon both parties in the non-union sector. Specifically,
the Supreme Court held that an age discrimination claim brought by an employee of a Wall Street
securities corporation must be submitted to arbitration because of the agreement signed by the employee.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in the case in order to resolve the circuit split. The landscape
of labor law could change significantly if the Supreme Court affirms the Fourth Circuit's opinion, as
many of the amicus briefs already filed argue. Amicus briefs have been filed by the National Academy
of Arbitrators, the National Employment Lawyers Association, NOW Legal Defense and Education
Fund, Association of Trial Lawyers, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, the National
Partnership for Women and Families, the United States, the EEOC, the ACLU, the AARP, and the
American Federation of Labor all in support of the petitioner.
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SUPREME COURT WELL CONSIDER ARBITRATION'S ROLE AT WORK
The New York Times
March 3, 1998
Section A; Page 14; Column I
By Linda Greenhouse
The Supreme Court agreed today to decide whether a clause in a labor contract requiring workplace
disputes to be resolved by arbitration bars individual workers from suing their employer for
discrimination.
The case is an appeal by a longshoreman who tried to bring a lawsuit under the Americans With
Disabilities Act after a group of shipping companies refused to hire him when he returned after
recovering from a serious on-the-job injury.
The Federal appeals court in Richmond ruled last year that because the collective bargaining
agreement between the International Longshoreman's Association and employers in the Port of
Charleston, S.C. provided for grievance and arbitration of all "matters under dispute between the
parties," the worker had in effect given up his right to sue.
The relationship between increasingly popular arbitration clauses and the battery of Federal anti-
discrimination laws has been a source of great dispute in the lower Federal courts. "This issue arises
literally daily, in some union-represented bargaining unit somewhere in the nation," the longshoreman's
lawyers said in their petition urging the Justices to resolve the issue.
Though the law at issue in this case is the disability act, the Justices' decision will also apply to other
Federal laws that bar discrimination in the workplace based on race, sex and age.
In contrast to the ruling in this case by the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit,
most of the Federal appeals courts have ruled that workers covered by contracts with arbitration clauses
retain their right to bring discrimination suits.
Those decisions have largely been based on a 1974 Supreme Court ruling, Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Company, which held that an employee covered by an arbitration agreement could nonetheless
sue his employer for racial discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
In that case, in a unanimous decision written by Justice Lewis F Powell Jr., the Court said the
contractual right to submit a dispute to arbitration and the legal right not to be discriminated against
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were not interchangeable. "Both rights have legally independent origins and are equally available to the
aggrieved employee," Justice Powell said.
The 1974 decision also noted that informal arbitration procedures offered employees fewer legal
protections than the rules that apply in Federal court, and that arbitrators may not be knowledgeable
about Federal discrimination law. "The specialized competence of arbitrators pertains primarily to the
law of the shop, not the law of the land," Justice Powell said.
However, the Fourth Circuit, in the case now before the Supreme Court, concluded that the Justices
had sharply limited the 1974 ruling in a decision from 1991, Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane
Corporation. In that case, the Court ruled that a stockbroker who had agreed to the New York Stock
Exchange's rule requiring arbitration of employment disputes between brokers and member firms could
not sue his employer for age discrimination.
So the question for the Court in the new case, Wright v. Universal Maritime Service Corporation,
No. 97-889, is which of the two precedents should govern the longshoreman's discrimination suit.
Although the Court was not completely clear in the 1991 case, that 7-to-2 decision indicated that the
Justices were elaborating on, rather than overruling, their earlier decision.
Justice Byron R. White's majority opinion, noting the "tension between collective representation and
individual statutory rights," drew a distinction between the stockbroker, who had entered into an
individual arbitration agreement and could fairly be held to it, and union members, who were part of such
an agreement only by virtue of collective bargaining and should not have to give up their "independent
statutory rights accorded by Congress."
Copyright @ 1998 by The New York Times.
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ARBITRATING DISCRIMINATION CASES UNDER UNION CONTRACTS
The National Law Journal
Volume 20, Number 36
May 4, 1998
Charles A. Edwards, Esq.*
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice PLLC
Are employees who are governed by collective bargaining agreements entitled to greater rights than
their non-union counterparts? This question is presented in Wright v. Universal Maritime Service, a
case which arose in Charleston, SC.
Ceasar Wright, a longshoreman, was severely injured when he fell from the top of a cargo container
and landed on one heel. He filed a claim for benefits under the Longshore and Harbor Workers
Compensation Act, which he ultimately settled for a lump-sum payment of $250,000. Nearly three years
after his injury, Wright tried to return to work. The association of stevedoring contractors informed
Wright's union that Wright was not "qualified" to work under the terms of the labor agreement. Instead
of processing a grievance, however, the union advised Wright to obtain counsel, and charges of disability
discrimination were filed.
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission dismissed the charges, whereupon Wright
commenced litigation in U.S. District Court. In three successive decisions -- a recommendation by a
Magistrate Judge, an adoption and amplification of that recommendation by a District Judge, and a denial
of reconsideration -- Wright's claims were dismissed due to his failure to proceed through the
collectively-bargained grievance-and-arbitration procedure. Wright appealed to the Fourth Circuit,
which issued an unpublished opinion affirming the decisions below. Wright then petitioned for certiorari,
which was granted on March 3.
The Court will be called on to resolve a dispute among the circuits regarding the permissibility of
binding arbitration of "statutory" claims such as employment discrimination disputes under collective
bargaining agreements. Such arbitration is already available as an alternative to litigation in the nonunion
sector, as the Court's 1991 decision in Gilmer v. Interstate Johavon Lane clearly established.
Gilmer dealt with an age discrimination claim. In Congressional action bracketing that decision, both
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Civil Rights Act of 1992 contained sections expressly
encouraging the use of alternative dispute resolution procedures including arbitration. On that basis, the
Fourth Circuit, in Austin v. Owens-Brockway Glass Container, determined that Alexander is no longer
controlling, and that a colective bargaining agreement containing an arbitration procedure which covers
claims arising under federal law "ousts a court of jurisdiction" over employment discrimination
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complaints of employees subject to such an agreement. The Fourth Circuit reasoned that Ms. Austin's
disability claim was arbitrable under the labor contract and that deferral to that process was mandated
by the language of the ADA.
The decisions in Wright adhered to the logic of Austin. Since Austin was decided, however, the
Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have concluded that Alexander is still alive,
and that statutory discrimination claims cannot be resolved in arbitration under a collective bargaining
agreement. The fundamental issue presented in Wright is, therefore, whether labor-management
arbitration can satisfy the policies underlying federal employment discrimination legislation, or whether
the possibility of a union's unfair or negligent representation suffices to force all such disputes into the
courts. If the second alternative prevails, the rationale for union representation is called into severe
question.
*- Charles A. Edwards is a partner in the law firm of Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice PLLC where he heads their Labor,
Employment and Immigration practice group. Mr. Edwards, who is resident in the firn's Raleigh, NC, office, represents the
respondents mi Wright v. Universal Maritime Service, et al., in which the Supreme ICourt granted certiorari in March.
This column is provided by the Legal News Network (R) (www~legulnwsnet.com), a division of Levick Strategic
Communications. The content is solely the responsibility of the author.
Copyright 0 1998 by New York Law Publishing, Inc.
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Many employers are taking away employees' rights to sue in the courts over workplace issues.
Instead, workplace disputes are being shifted into a non-judicial and often secretive realm where rulings
need not always follow the law.
In order to get or keep a job, tens of thousands of workers are being told they must submit to
mandatory arbitration. That means discrimination, harassment or others claims are heard in a private
office by paid arbitrators.
Under federal law, arbitrators need no credentials or training. Written opinions need not be issued.
Appeals are rare. Refusal to submit future claims to arbitration often results in firing.
Critics say companies have found the gilded loophole for escaping costly jury awards and punitive
damages. The system, they say, is fast eroding hard-won civil rights protections.
"What they're really trying to do is get out of the legal system as best they can," says Paul Carrington,
a law professor at Duke University in Durham, N.C. "Employees are bargaining away their rights."
A host of companies, including Circuit City, Travelers Group and Hooters of America, make workers
abide by mandatory arbitration. The Olive Garden and Red Lobster will finish rolling out their
requirements this summer.
The clauses also are cropping up in many consumer agreements drafted by banks, brokers, health
plans and other firms. Bank of America, Kaiser Permanente, computer-seller Gateway and others
require arbitration in some contracts.
The arbitration business
Arbitration is giving rise to a booming industry all its own. Professional arbitrators hire themselves
out to various firms, charging from about $150 an hour to thousands.
Private companies supplying for-hire arbitrators (dubbed "neutrals") have prospered.
JAMS/Endispute, the nation's largest private arbitration and mediation firm, brought in about $50
million in 1996.
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"I've seen how helpful and beneficial it can be," says Richard Chernick, a Los Angeles-based
arbitrator. "It's fair and extraordinarily flexible. It provides a meaningful alternative."
But some find the industry growth alarming. Critics say:
Women claiming harassment may be forced to divulge sexual histories because federal evidence rules
often don't apply in arbitration. "They can put in gynecological information, all kinds of horrible things,
that you couldn't do in a courtroom," says Lauren Asher at the National Partnership for Women and
Families.
Arbitrators are sometimes hired repeatedly by a company, raising concerns they will side with
businesses to avoid losing exclusive contracts. "If an arbitrator rules against a company, will they ever
work for that company again?" says Stewart Karlin, an employment lawyer in Fort Lauderdale, Fla.
The closed-door process silences public discussion because arbitrators are not legally required to
issue written decisions. Wrongs can be hidden, critics say, if there is no public record.
Critics: Process flawed
Arbitrators may lack the legal power to force employers to change discriminatory practices. And
despite efforts to add more women and minorities, critics argue that too many arbitrators are white
males lacking the diversity of a jury panel.
Some say the process is so flawed workers shouldn't be forced to abide.
"The whole thing really stinks," says Bob Letwin, who says he was fired from Bentley's, a luggage
retailer, for not signing an arbitration clause. "There's no written opinion, it's all hush
hush. The arbitrator doesn't even have to know the law. It's a shame this is going on."
Letwin, of Fort Lauderdale, brought his case to the National Labor Relations Board; he says he was
reinstated in 1996 and is now retired. Bentley's did not return calls seeking comment.
Fighting an arbitration requirement is tough, opponents say, because judges have a vested interest
in supporting the system. Many judges are looking for ways to clear overflowing dockets.
And working as an arbitrator is an alluring retirement career for those on the bench, who also must
rule on the legality of arbitration clauses.
"It's a scandal happening in the light of day," says Cliff Palefsky, a San Francisco-based employment
lawyer. "Arbitration has created a supplemental judicial retirement system, and it's wrong."
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At JAMS/Endispute, there are about 350 arbitrators and mediators earning $250 or more an hour.
"A lot of them are former judges," says Susan Bunney, spokeswoman for the Irvine, Calif -based
company, adding that many employees prefer the confidentiality.
The industry has grown as employers look for relief Discrimination cases filed in federal court rose
from 8,000 in 1991 to more than 24,000 today, according to the Bureau of National
Affairs.
"It's faster, it's cheaper," says Dottie Wade at Travelers. "We think it's better for us and for the
employees."
The arbitration process
For the most part, here's how it works: A company sets up a process to handle internal complaints.
Employees may learn of the requirement through a memo, job application or language written into an
employee handbook.
The process often involves bringing complaints to a manager, peer-review panel or mediator. If
those alternatives fail, workers must go to arbitration.
Employers and workers often agree on who will serve as arbitrator, but in some cases it's the boss'
pick. Costs may be split or picked up by the employer. In some cases, loser pays all.
Employees must submit to the process to get or keep jobs.
When Donald Lagatree refused to sign a clause at two separate law firms, the legal secretary was
fired by both.
Lawsuits he filed challenging the mandates were rejected by Los Angeles Superior courts.
"It seemed so unfair," says Lagatree, 43, of Long Beach, Calif "I didn't think I should sign away my
constitutional rights. It was more than a matter of money to me."
Critics worry companies may hide damaging information since depositions and discovery are often
curtailed; arbitrators don't always have the same legal power as a judge to require documents be turned
over.
Appeals are tough, legal experts say. Most can only be made on grounds such as fraud, bias or the
intentional skirting of a law known to the arbitrator.
The compulsory practice has taken off since Gilmer vs. Intersiate/Johnson Lane, a 1991 case in
which the Supreme Court ruled a securities representative with an age-discrimination
complaint had to submit to arbitration.
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Congress amended the Civil Rights Act in 1991 to guarantee a jury trial to plaintiffs with complaints
such as sex, national origin, religious or racial discrimination.
But arbitration clauses require workers to give up that right by going to paid dispute settlers.
More companies are adopting the practice. The American Arbitration Association (AAA), an
industry giant, handled cases for a few dozen companies in 1991. Now it serves about 350 firms
employing 4 million workers covered by both mandatory and voluntary arbitration clauses.
"It really is a major trend," says Toni Griffin at the AAA. "In most cases, employees are looking for
an apology or a change in policy."
In the wake of criticism, the National Association of Securities Dealers moved to end mandatory
arbitration of brokers' employment cases. The Securities and Exchange Commission approved the
change in June, but such reversals still buck the trend.
Hoping to guarantee fairness, large firms that farm out arbitrators have adopted self-imposed
guidelines.
Arbitrators are trained. They won't work for companies they don't think play fair, such as those who
ban depositions or keep workers from bringing in their own representation. Both sides must agree to
the arbitrators used. Some require arbitrators to issue written opinions and decide cases based on the
law.
But critics say the guides only sugar-coat systemic problems, since nothing is legally enforceable.
Employers who don't want to abide by the guidelines can simply ignore them, they say, shopping around
for other arbitrators. Workers, some say, deserve a choice.
"I'm not really comfortable saying I'm a substitute for the court. It still gnaws at me," says Arnold
Zack, a Boston-based arbitrator and past president of the National Academy of Arbitrators. "A free
system will give much greater protection."
But supporters say employers who turn the process into a private star chamber will be exposed
through legal challenges. They say the process, which leads to smaller financial awards than those in jury
trials, is less contentious and time consuming.
"The rationale is it's faster, less expensive, fairer and more consistent," says Mike McNeil, at the
Atlanta-based Hooters restaurant chain.
And supporters argue that many critics are lawyers with their own cloaked agenda.
"Lawyers lose in an arbitration setting," says Alfred Feliu, a New York arbitrator. "By definition,
they're not going to make as much money."
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But some employees say suing should be their right.
Etel Lindblom tried to bring a lawsuit against her former employer, Tenet Healthcare, claiming age
discrimination.
The Fort Lauderdale nurse says she was shocked to learn she'd signed away her right to sue. A U.S.
District Court ruled she had to abide by a clause mandating arbitration. Tenet did not return calls
seeking comment.
"I didn't know what arbitration was. They just gave me an employee handbook and you sign that you
received it," says Lindblom, 54. "It favors the employer. I think it's dirty politics."
PROS AND CONS
SUPPORTERS SAY
Financial awards tend to be more reasonable
because arbitration avoids the emotional
reaction of juries.
Arbitrators are typically trained and
experienced in employment law and abide by a
code of ethics and standards.
Arbitrators typically are mutually agreed upon
by both sides.
Arbitration costs are less expensive than a jury
trial because lawyers aren't always needed,
and the process is much shorter than a judicial
proceeding.
Companies that provide arbitrators are
actively recruiting a diverse staff.
CRITICS SAY
Arbitration silences public discussion of
findings because the process is confidential
and written opinions need not be issued.
Companies can limit the damages claimants
receive and deny them payment of lawyers
fees.
Arbitrators, unlike judges, often lack the
ability to order a company to take corrective
action to change discriminatory practices.
Arbitration is more costly than lawsuits, which
cost about $150 to file. Claimants may be
required to split the arbitration costs or pay all
fees if they lose. Arbitrators may charge
$150-$3,000 an hour.
Most arbitrators are white males and lack the
diversity of ajury panel.
Copyright @ 1998. USA Today.
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97-889 WRIGHT v. UNIVERSAL MARITIME SERVICE CORP.
(Ruling Below: 121 F.3d 702 (4' Cir. 1998), 157 L.R.R.M. 2640, 11 N.D.L.R. 2)
An Employee's failure to submit Americans with Disabilities Act claim to arbitration under
collective bargaining agreement arbitration clause that covers 'all matters affecting wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment' precludes federal court jurisdiction over claim.
Question presented: Was court below correct in holding- contrary to Alexander v. Gardner- Denver
Co., and other cases, and contrary to seven other circuits- that general arbitration clause in collective





UNIVERSAL MARITIME SERVICE CORPORATION, et al, Defendants-Appellees.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.
Decided: July 29, 1997
PER CURIAM:
Ceasar Wright sued the South Carolina
Stevedores Association ("SCSA") and six of
its individual members alleging violations of
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The
district court, relying on Austin v. Owens-
Brockway Glass Container, dismissed the case
because Wright had failed to submit his claim
to arbitration as required by the collective
bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the
SCSA and Wright's union. On appeal, Wright
argues that Austin is inapplicable because the
CBA here does not specifically address ADA
claims. This contention is meritless. An
arbitration agreement need not list every
possible dispute between the parties in order to
be binding. To hold otherwise would directly
contradict Supreme Court precedent and the
strong federal policy favoring arbitration.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
I.
Ceasar Wright worked as a longshoreman in
Charleston, South Carolina from 1970 to
1992. On February 18, 1992, he was injured
at work. Consequently, Wright filed suit for
benefits under. the Longshore and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act, and his
employer, Stevens Shipping Company, settled
the claim for $250,000. During the course of
this suit, Wright represented that he had been
totally and permanently disabled.
On January 2, 1995, Wright appeared at the
hiring hall of the Local 1422 of the
International Longshoreman's Association
("the union"), claiming that he was ready and
able to return to work. Wright presented a
note from his physician, Dr. Howard Brilliant,
which stated that he could return to full duty.
From January 2 through January 11, 1995,
the union referred Wright to four different
stevedoring contractors. Initially, none of
these employers objected to Wright's work.
However, when the companies discovered that
Wright had earlier received a settlement for
total and permanent disability, they, both
individually and acting through their multi-
employer collective bargaining representative
the SCSA, advised the union that Wright
would no longer be accepted for employment
referral. The SCSA maintained that under the
CBA, Wright was not qualified to work due to
his total and permanent disability.
The union responded with a letter disputing
the SCSA's interpretation of the CBA.
However, neither Wright nor the union ever
filed a formal grievance under the CBA's
arbitration procedure, and the union advised
Wright to pursue a statutory claim under the
Americans with Disabilities Act. Wright then
filed this suit against the SCSA and six of its
individual members.
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The case was referred to a magistrate judge
who, citing Austin v. Owens- Brockway Glass
Container, recommended the case be dismissed
because Wright had failed to submit his claim
to arbitration as required by the CBA. The
district court adopted this position over
Wright's objections. Wright now appeals.
II.
In Austin, this court established that
collective bargaining agreements to arbitrate
employment disputes are binding upon
individual employees even when the dispute
involves a federal cause of action. Where such
an agreement exists, a failure to process a
claim under the agreement precludes a court
from exercising jurisdiction over the merits of
the claim. Id. Wright did not submit his claim
to arbitration. Thus, under Austin, the only
issue in this case is whether there was an
agreement to arbitrate ADA claims in the CBA
between Wright's union and the SCSA.
The arbitration clause at issue is particularly
broad. The clause states that the "Union
agrees that this Agreement is intended to cover
all matters affecting wages, hours, and other
terms and conditions of employment."
However, Wright contends that since the
agreement does not specifically address ADA
claims it cannot be binding here.
We are unpersuaded. An employer need
not provide a laundry list of potential disputes
in order for them to be covered by an
arbitration clause. For example, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., the Supreme
Court held that a plaintiff was required to
submit his ADEA claim to arbitration where
the arbitration agreement covered "any
dispute, claim or controversy." The language
of the CBA at issue in this case is equally
broad, covering "all matters" regarding "terms
and conditions of employment." This language
easily encompasses Wright's ADA claim. A
narrower interpretation of the agreement
would fly directly in the face of both the
ADA's statutory preference for arbitration, and
the strong federal policy favoring alternative
dispute resolution.
Under Austin, Wright must submit his claim
to arbitration. Wright, however, contends that
we should remand this case so that the district
court may retain jurisdiction to monitor the
arbitration process. We decline this invitation.
Austin does not require a district court to
retain jurisdiction once a case is dismissed for
failure to exercise arbitral remedies. Indeed,
the district court precisely followed Austin 's
instruction that a claim that has not been
properly submitted to arbitration should be
dismissed without prejudice and without any
opinion on "the merits of the claim, or whether
or not the same is subject to arbitration."
Those issues are for the arbitrators, and the
district court's disposition of this case was
entirely proper.
III.
For the foregoing reasons we affirm the
judgment of the district court.
AFFIRMED.
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